

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The situation of Bedouins in their seven towns in Israel's Negev is a national disgrace. The towns lack most urban amenities, their population suffers from the highest rates of unemployment and the lowest incomes in the country. Poor educational facilities are ensuring they will fall further behind as the country develops scientifically and technologically. This report explains how this situation came about, and what we propose to do about it.

We find that the major cause of the problem is a combination of poorly conceived urban policies, which created the towns without the least effort to make them viable, and systemic discrimination, which prevented any serious remedial efforts from taking place. Underlying both is a widespread attitude towards the Bedouins that is at once patronizing and uncaring.

To turn things around, two basic requirements must be met. First, a plan must be formulated that has the prospect of making real change possible. Second, the decision to implement the plan must not be left to others. Moreover, the plan must be capable of being implemented quickly, and at relatively low cost.

The central problem that appears to be dragging the towns down is the absence of an economic dynamic. Without local enterprises, most of the working age population must find work outside. But there are problems of transportation to those jobs, and discrimination in hiring that consign them to the most marginal positions in the labor force, at the lowest wages and with the poorest working conditions. For Bedouin women, who cannot easily leave their towns to find work, the problem is much more severe. Low incomes mean a small local tax base, and that in turn has led to a deficiency of urban infrastructure as well as social and community services. Government transfers of resources to Bedouin localities have been highly discriminatory, aggravating an already serious situation. Not enough land is available for homes, for business and for urban expansion. Not surprisingly, the population is disillusioned with the government, and hostile towards its own local authorities, who are perceived as ineffective. Without work, with little income, with little to do, urban youth in particular have become alienated, and are pursuing criminal activities in greater and greater numbers. The towns have become pressure cookers, and without relief, they will explode, influencing all in their vicinity.

To deal with this central problem, we have prepared a development plan that has the potential to make the towns, individually and collectively, economically viable. The plan is based on the proposition that a large number of synergistic initiatives that build on existing advantages and opportunities can, in combination, have a significant impact. The plan identifies national and regional infrastructure projects, such as the railway, the road system, a planned airport and the like that can, with modest adjustments to accommodate the needs of the towns, eliminate some of the barriers they face, and create new economic opportunities. Projects focusing on other elements of regional and urban infrastructure more specific to the Bedouin community are identified, including major investments in regional transport, human capital and finance.

A number of projects that can be developed in most if not all of the towns are identified, particularly in the areas of manpower development, education, investment incentives and agriculture. In addition, specialties for each of the towns reflecting their comparative advantages, location and size are identified. Rahat and Tel Sheva should serve as the engines of Bedouin urban development, to help bring along the other towns as well. The plan proposes that Rahat focus its future development primarily on becoming an *administrative center*, and a number of projects are identified to that end. They include a branch of Soroka Hospital in the vicinity, a Bedouin community college, and offices of national and regional agencies dealing with Bedouin affairs. Tel Sheva is designated as the *economic pole* of the plan, due to locational advantages that can, with modest investments, be made highly effective in stimulating the local economy. Core activities for each of the other towns are also identified. The success of any Bedouin urban development plan will depend in no small measure on the ability of the Negev as a whole, with Beer Sheva as its major center, to take off economically. Building strong ties to the larger Negev economy as well as to each other offers the Bedouin towns an important key to success.

Since all projects cannot be implemented at the same time, a strategic approach is required that takes into account relative significance, or priority of the individual projects, with some attention to rough orders of magnitude of incremental costs and to likely time frames. The proposals contained herein are based on an initial assessment of possibilities. They are prototypical elements in what, for the towns, is an entirely new planning orientation. Consultations will lead to a much more complete and acceptable list of projects. After the amended strategic plan has been accepted detailed action or business plans will be formulated.

Implementing such a complex planning framework is no less a challenge. We stress the importance of the Bedouin community playing a lead role in moving the plan ahead, to prevent a continuation of top down, insensitive planning. Our policy

orientation requires that the planning and implementation be of the Bedouins, by the Bedouins and for the Bedouins. Such a role requires the creation of appropriate agencies, most important of which is the proposed Bedouin Urban Development Agency. It will play a lead role in creating other necessary developmental organizations, lobbying government for equitable transfers and suitable development funds, leveraging projects to the advantage of the Bedouin towns, working with the municipalities, foreign investors, and so forth. Among the most important immediate tasks is to train and recruit competent Bedouin managers and some opportunities in that area have already begun to be explored.

These proposals are designed to make the Bedouin towns “work”. They do so both by addressing the prerequisites of economic development in a serious fashion, and by promoting fundamental changes in approach, both on the part of Israel’s majority and on the part of the Bedouin community. The former has negative attitudes that have kept the Bedouins in a status of impoverished dependency, and these attitudes must be changed. The latter lacks tools and experience that are required to foster self-reliance and intra- and inter-community cooperation.

By taking on these formidable challenges, our plan faces heavy, possibly impossible odds. By not taking them on, the alternatives are much worse, not only for the Bedouins but for Israeli society as a whole.

Acknowledgments

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INTRODUCTION

The time has come for a fundamentally different approach to dealing with the problems faced by the newly urbanizing Bedouin community in the Negev. The community has suffered and continues to suffer from gross injustices perpetrated upon it for at least a century. And while the injustices did not begin with the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the latter has done much to perpetuate and even aggravate the situation. Beginning with non-recognition of the traditional rights of an indigenous, pastoral, nomadic people to its land, policies were instituted first to restrict them from the use of their land, then to uproot them from that land, then to relocate them in pseudo-urban communities and finally to prevent those communities from developing in a viable fashion.

The result is that the urban Bedouins are impoverished and angry. They will in less than two decades become the majority in the Negev, in itself more than half the area of the country. Unless ways are found to make them equal partners in the progress that the rest of the nation is enjoying, the future for them and for their Jewish neighbors will be bleak indeed.

It is evident that the unending stream of calls by the Bedouins themselves and by numerous objective observers, to correct this historical injustice is not being heeded in Jerusalem or in Tel Aviv. Apparently morality and justice do not constitute sufficient grounds for public action. Nor does the narrow self-interest of the majority in the Negev and in the nation as a whole. As a result, the Bedouin community is left with no alternative but to initiate its own program of action that might turn things around.

This report provides the rationale for and the broad outlines of such a program of action. It examines what is needed, what is possible, and what the Bedouins can do to move it ahead. It recognizes that the Bedouins will need government support for many of the proposed initiatives. It attempts to find solutions that are cost effective and with as many multiplier effects as possible. Where possible it advocates extending existing programs at modest incremental costs, rather than opting for costlier new efforts. It identifies a rather new role for Bedouins, including taking the initiative in creating appropriate institutions and launching a wide variety of autonomous projects. As a result, the program of action is both strategic and responsible. It does for the Bedouin towns what the government has failed to do not only for them, but also for most towns and cities in Israel.

The traditional role of government, of providing only handouts to compliant local authorities, must come to an end. Not only have the Bedouins been massively discriminated against in that process, but it has made them dependent on scores of state agencies whose demonstrated interests do not coincide with those of the Bedouins. Quantities of these funds have been diverted to unplanned and unneeded uses, or are retracted when they cannot be expended according to the donor's unrealistic timetable. What is needed at this juncture is not what politicians and bureaucrats decree from above, but what the community wants, needs and deserves. To be persuasive, those requirements must be spelled out in the form of creative plans that are viable. The time for supplication is over. The time for imaginative thinking and serious planning has arrived.

The remainder of this report is composed of three major sections. Part I provides a brief review of the reasons for the current situation, indicating not only what is needed, but why. We have drawn on the most recent information available, including a comprehensive survey of the community undertaken as part of this project, which is documented in a monograph entitled *Bedouin Urban Survey – 2000 (Survey)*. In addition, the recently published *Statistical Yearbook of the Negev Bedouin (SYNB)* provides for the first time a comprehensive data base on virtually all aspects of Bedouin urban life. It and its companion *Statistical Yearbook of the Negev (SYN)* together with our survey underscore what has been widely reported in countless reports and studies, in presentations by Bedouin urban leaders, as well as in official government statistics. The particular problem of discrimination in the allocation of grants to the Bedouin towns is explicitly addressed in a specially commissioned paper by Prof. Eran Razin, entitled *The Financial Capacity of the Bedouin Local Authorities in the Negev (Local Finance)*. A modest *Survey of Bedouin Urban Business (Business Survey)* is being conducted for this project. It attempts to find answers as to why so little economic activity has emerged in the towns, and what might help. These latter reports will be released soon in a single monograph entitled *Background Studies*.

In Part II, a program of action, or strategic plan is presented. This plan draws on some of the ideas developed in the second of the monographs prepared for this study, entitled *An Urban Development Strategy for the Negev's Bedouin Community (Strategy)*. The plan, already published provides a far-reaching initiative designed to finally turn things around, in a way that is relevant, feasible and financially responsible.

Refining and implementing a development plan as complex and challenging as this itself requires careful planning. Part III concludes this report with an implementation plan. The people and the government of Israel have the opportunity

to become full partners in this effort. They can begin to right historical wrongs and thereby correct some of the most egregious ethical lapses that have characterized the first fifty-two years of the State's existence. They might also discover in it new and imaginative ways to rebuild the other neglected and impoverished cities and towns of the Negev. Beyond that, they could join the ranks of the very few enlightened nations that have begun to deal honorably with their indigenous peoples.

WHERE WE ARE, HOW WE GOT HERE, AND WHAT WE NEED

Origins of Bedouin Settlement Policy

The history of Bedouin settlement policy in Israel's Negev has been well documented.ⁱ Our purpose here is merely to review the basic outlines of that history to provide a context for our analysis.

For centuries prior to the founding of the State of Israel, the Bedouins in the Negev engaged in traditional activities of raising livestock and agriculture in a semi-nomadic fashion. They claimed title to land that they lived upon, or utilized, but these claims were not recognized in Ottoman or British laws that the newly created State of Israel adopted. Policies of evicting and denying residence on those lands, as well as herding, followed. Official reasons for these policies included a desire to rationalize the provision of health, educational and welfare services, but most objective observers have concluded that the overriding reason was to enable the State to assume control over most of the lands in the Negev, for Zionist or security reasons.ⁱⁱ

To accommodate these Bedouins, in 1968 the government built the first urban center at Tel Sheva, a few kilometers northeast of Beer Sheva. By 1990, the remaining six towns had been established. Figure 1 indicates the location of these towns within the Negev's system of cities.

A number of planning mistakes made the Tel Sheva initiative a failure. Most of these errors reflected insensitivity to the special needs and concerns of the Bedouin community. Dwelling units were too small and neighborhoods were too congested. Nor did persons from different tribes or families mix very well. Some greater attention was paid to the planning of Rahat, founded in 1972, and the town succeeded in achieving a very rapid rate of population growth. In 1982, after the withdrawal from Sinai, the area that is now the Nevatim air base was claimed by the government, leading to the displacement of Bedouin families in that area. The new towns of Kseifa and Arara were established to accommodate them. Two years later, Segev Shalom was established, and Hura and Laqiya, the newest, were established a decade ago. The result is that by the year 2000, approximately 70,000 persons live in the seven towns, constituting slightly over one-half of the Bedouin population, which itself is one-quarter of the total population of the Negev.

Planning for Failure

Israel's approach has ensured that the Bedouin urban experience would be a failure. It created an impoverished, undereducated, unemployed, hostile community, which has rapidly become alienated from the State and the majority population.

Our research, following the work of other analysts, reveals a litany of planning failures, which can be briefly summarized:

a. Insufficient lands

The amount of land made available in the towns is not sufficient to enable orderly expansion and introduction of the necessary range of urban amenities, including infrastructure, social and communal facilities, business enterprises, and so forth. Our survey indicates a lack of sewers, sidewalks, inferior roads, absence of playgrounds, childcare centers, and industry.

b. Restrictive planning regulations

Rules and regulations restrict even the most basic types of economic activities, and prevent the free workings of the land market, making land unavailable and land costs unreasonably high.

c. Insufficient local government budgets

Regular municipal budgets come from two sources: transfers from the central government, and self-generated funds from local taxes. In addition, there are extraordinary grants for development projects. Prof. Razin's paper (*Local Finance*) confirms the findings of the Suwari report that there remains systematic discrimination against Bedouin municipalities by national funding agencies.ⁱⁱⁱ Formulas are biased against the Bedouin towns, and the development grants provided are miniscule compared to urgent needs and to what is provided to comparable Jewish towns. The absence of an economic base and high unemployment means that local tax collections are insignificant. This failure was officially recognized in the most recent report of the State Comptroller.^{iv} Recommendations to eliminate these biases have only been implemented to a limited extent.

d. Absence of local autonomy

Until September 2000, the Mayors of the four youngest Bedouin towns were appointed. The previous appointees were not Bedouins, responsible to the community, but outsiders with primary loyalty to the party that appointed them.

e. Absence of an economic base

Our *Business Survey* reveals that there are only a handful of private enterprises in the Bedouin towns, mostly small and backward. The result is that virtually the entire potential labor force is obliged to try to find work outside the towns. But there, they encounter systematic discrimination. In the whole of the Negev, less than 400 Bedouins were employed in manufacturing firms, out of a total sectoral labor force of 15,000. Few were employed in the large modern industrial plants, and none were employed in the high tech sector. (Appendix 2) The result is extremely high rates of unemployment and underemployment, and in particular among the female sector of the labor force, for whom travel to external work is less acceptable.

f. Absence of government jobs

There were a total 15 Bedouins employed by government agencies excluding education, culture and religious affairs (*Strategy*, Table 6.1), a situation unambiguously reflecting systemic discrimination.

g. Inferior education

The Katz report has documented the massive failure of education policies for the Bedouin sector generally.^v It cites inadequate teaching staff, major shortages of classrooms, poor matriculation (Bagrut) results, extremely high drop out rates, special problems of girls, and so forth. Its many sensible recommendations have been and continue to be ignored.

h. Inadequate health services

The towns continue to have much lower levels of health services and poorer quality of such services, despite their greater health needs.

i. Inadequate social and recreational services

There are insufficient social service professionals and few recreational facilities in the towns, despite major problems of youth violence, crime, abuse of women, and an urgent need for child care facilities. The number of social workers, for example, is about one quarter to one fifth those in comparable Jewish towns. Few towns have proper sports fields and youth centers. Perhaps most symptomatic, not one has a proper public library.

The main culprits in this failure are the governments of Israel, past and present. The plans they have made and continue to make reflect neither the needs nor the interests of the Bedouin community. The Bedouins are not party to the planning process in any meaningful sense. Moreover, often-repeated government commitments to rectify wrongs, to meet obligations, and to correct discrimination have almost never been honored. An urban Bedouin would be justified if he/she concluded that the failure of the urbanization process was by design, since it is hard to believe that so much could have gone wrong by accident or by sheer incompetence.


The Consequences

a. Recent Statistics

Until recently, much of the evidence on the consequences of these failed policies for the urban Bedouins was partial, anecdotal and perhaps unconvincing. The recently published *Statistical Yearbook of the Negev 2000* contains detailed information on the actual status of the Bedouins. The picture it paints is one of overwhelming inequalities in virtually all spheres; economic, social, cultural and educational. Figure 2 summarizes several of the most important indicators of these inequalities, comparing the largest Bedouin town, Rahat, for which comprehensive

data are available, to Beer Sheva and to the oldest and largest Jewish suburb, Omer. Towns whose citizens are absolutely so deprived, and whose basic amenities are so far below that of their neighbors must be judged to be failures.

Figure 2: Selected Urban Comparisons



Source: SYN 2000.

b. Official Evidence

Most Israelis, in their public and private roles, have managed to tune out the complaints of the Bedouins. They dismiss the evidence cited above, as non-scientific, based on exaggeration or unreliable data. Nor are other published data that confirm our findings given much more credence, including selected surveys and serious academic studies on specific topics.^{vi} In an attempt to counter this cynicism, we present in this section evidence from official government sources on what is probably the single most important measure of policy failure, the socio-economic gap between the Bedouin population and the rest of society. Virtually all other indicators of deprivation are so highly correlated with that measure that further churning of official data would be redundant.

Each year an official report is produced ranking local authorities in Israel according to a socio-economic index. For 1995, the following was the ranking for the seven Bedouin towns in the Negev, compared with Beer Sheva as well as their neighboring Jewish towns.

Table 1: Socio-Economic Ranking of Local Authorities, 1995

		Rank
Bedouin Towns	Rahat	1
	Arara	2
	Tel Sheva	3
	Kseifa	4
	Segev Shalom	6
	Laqiya	7
	Hura	17
Jewish Towns	Beer Sheva	107
	Dimona	59
	Arad	121
	Metar	190
	Lehavim	192
	Omer	201

Note: 1 denotes the *lowest* ranking among the 204 local authorities in Israel.

Source: *SYNB*, Table 7.13

Five of the seven Bedouin towns are the lowest ranked in Israel. The largest Bedouin town, Rahat, is the lowest of all. By itself, this information should quiet

the doubters. However, such information indicates only rankings, and some towns, or even a group of towns, have to be ranked lowest. Moreover, ranking does not provide any indication as to how wide the absolute gap is, say between Rahat, now the second largest city in the Negev, and Beer Sheva, its largest city and the regional capital. Income data, although not without their own problems, are better indicators of the extent of such gaps.

Because of both lower rates of pay and higher unemployment, as reported by the Central Bureau of Statistics, the annual take home pay of an urban Bedouin worker is between 30 and 40% less than that of the typical worker in Beer Sheva. Bedouin women work outside the home much less than do others, on average less than 7 months a year, compared to the Beer Sheva average of 9 months. In consequence, *family* earned income among urban Bedouins is less than half that of the average family in Beer Sheva, which itself is considerably lower than the Israeli average. Add to that the fact that the average household size in the Bedouin towns is roughly double that of Beer Sheva, and the *family income per person* declines to under 25% of that of Beer Sheva and perhaps as low as 20% of the Israeli average. At the extreme, the urban Bedouin level of per capita earned income is about one-tenth of that in Omer. (for more data and sources, see *Strategy*, Ch. 1)

There is a widespread view that Bedouins receive compensation for these income disadvantages in the form of more generous transfer payments from the government. Allowances for larger families are theoretically an ameliorating factor, but many Bedouin families do not receive them. In Israel as a whole, 98% of children receive child support allowances, but in the Bedouin towns, the proportion ranges from 49 to 92%.^{vii} Unemployment benefits should also provide an offset, but again, payments received by Bedouins are in fact lower. Government transfers of services such as health and education tend to be less inequitable than the private income gaps. But numerous studies confirm that they also discriminate against the Bedouins so that the absolute private gaps are not in any way ameliorated.

The above is incontrovertible evidence from the government itself that the family and per capita income gaps are extremely high, reflecting lower earned income, higher unemployment rates, and the very limited offset provided by public transfers of goods and services. There can be little doubt that the Bedouin towns exist as third world communities within an affluent society.

c. The Community's Perceptions: Survey Results

In this section, we present a summary of the results of our very extensive *Survey*. The purpose of the survey was to gain insights into the perceptions of a representative sample of urbanized Bedouins regarding all aspects of their lives in the seven towns. The sample of over 1800 households was stratified by age, sex and locality, and 127 questions were put to them by our surveyors. The survey was conducted in the early months of the year 2000, so that the results constitute the most recent information available on the subject.

The basic finding is that there is overwhelming dissatisfaction on the part of virtually all Bedouins with their urban condition. Only health services are "acceptable". In all other areas, from education to social services, and from physical infrastructure to employment, there is profound dissatisfaction. There is evidence of improvement in some material aspects of life, such as the growing presence of television and clothes washing machines, while other amenities remain scarce. Most worrisome, there is an almost total absence of confidence in local government, which is viewed as ineffective and corrupt. Trust in the national government, in particular with its means of dealing with land issues, is extremely low. The situation appears to be marginally better in the newer towns of Laqiya and Hura but only by the depressing standards that prevail elsewhere. Most are alarmed at the deterioration of social conditions, particularly among youth, and the associated advent of increasingly serious crime in their midst. The majority is not satisfied with its condition, and says by a ratio of two to one that it would prefer to live in a rural setting, and would not recommend the town to other Bedouins.

Our cross tabulations and multivariate analyses reported in the *Survey* offer a clearer picture of the factors most importantly associated with these circumstances and perceptions. For the purposes of this report, however, it is possible to conclude that virtually all of the negative data presented in the previous sections are fully backed up by the opinions of the larger community, perhaps even more forcefully.

This litany of failures may appear to be remote from the personal experience of the typical non-Bedouin. For those requiring a hands-on sense of the policy failure, a visit to one of the towns is recommended, followed by a visit to one of its Jewish neighbors. The stark contrast, between almost unremitting deprivation in the one, and almost ostentatious luxury in the other is more convincing than a shelf full of statistics.

We are therefore able to conclude, with a high degree of confidence, that the urban situation of the Bedouins is indeed so inferior as to constitute a stinging indictment of the government's past urbanization policies. The modest gains in a few areas

cannot compensate for the overwhelming sense of disappointment and frustration with the very services the Bedouins had been led to believe would be improved with urbanization, such as education, employment and welfare. The gaps that exist between them and their Jewish neighbors are immense and growing, increasing their sense of injustice and their anger. We are therefore obliged to conclude, on the basis of all this evidence, that the urbanization policy has been a failure, and that a radical new approach is urgently required.

Prognosis

So what? Well meaning citizens may feel that the dismal record reflects a moral and political failure that justifies action to correct the situation. While admirable, and absolutely correct, such an argument is unlikely to foment a revolution in thinking on the subject if past experience is any guide. And as a result, we do not propose to rest the case for initiating new policy on those grounds alone.

Self-interest is inevitably a more potent catalyst for reform. As a result of very rapid population growth in the towns, within a few years the urbanized Bedouins will be a major component of the regional population. (*Strategy*, pp. 20-24) Without fundamental policy changes this rapid growth will guarantee a social upheaval in the community and therefore in the region as a whole. A critical mass of urban unemployed (mostly youth) and poor will ensure that. Provision of basic urban services will become increasingly difficult for the Bedouin municipal authorities, whose legitimacy, as we noted above, is already very questionable in the eyes of residents. And the consequences will be felt in the larger Jewish community in ways that are already being foreshadowed.

The tensions between at least one Bedouin town, Tel Sheva, and its affluent Jewish neighbor, Omer, have reached crisis proportions. Disputes over land have been resolved by *force majeure*, rather than due legal process and above-board administrative procedures. Widening and highly visible gaps have provoked strong feelings of deprivation and injustice on the part of the Bedouins. Insecurity on the part of the Jews of Omer, as crime and theft increases, makes life less and less livable in what is deemed by official statistics to be one of the most livable towns in Israel. For example, the rate of car theft in Omer is reputed to be the highest in the country. Increased repression to control crime brings increased hostility. Our concern is that this downward spiral in intercommunal relations may be a precursor for other paired towns: Rahat and Lehavim, Hura and Metar, and even the Kseifa-Arad and Arara-Dimona pairs.

Top-level policy changes are being considered involving the creation of additional Bedouin towns. This “solution” may postpone the problem, but will make it worse in the long run. This is a policy of avoidance, and its failure to address the real, underlying problems immediately and seriously, while there is still time to effect fundamental change, will make the future task that much greater, that much more costly, and therefore that much more unlikely. No less than the future of the Bedouins and hence the future of the Negev is at stake.

A BEDOUIN URBAN DEVELOPMENT PLAN

An attempt to remedy the situation must begin with some basic, sobering facts. First, it is unlikely that the government will initiate any plans that constitute a fundamental change in direction. Second, it is also unlikely that the government will advance funds in the amounts necessary to compensate the urban Bedouins adequately for its failed policy. If the Bedouin community waits for either, or both, the next decades will be a replay of the past decades. What they can do is seize the initiative and set out what is wanted and needed. But that is not enough. A plan to demonstrate how to achieve those results, which is viable and financially responsible must be provided. And seriousness of purpose as well as credibility requires that the community assume a new role, of leading, planning, managing and taking ownership of the proposed course of action.

In formulating such a plan, we have attempted to identify first and foremost an overall approach rather than get bogged down in the detail, which in any event must be more fully calibrated and evaluated. The overall approach is of utmost importance, however, because in the absence of such a framework, urban policy in general in Israel has been unfocused and ultimately ineffective, and in no place more dramatically so than in the Negev. A completely different paradigm is required, based on relevant examples that have worked.

The fundamental problem underlying almost all else in the Bedouin towns is the lack of economic viability. Without jobs and businesses, incomes are low, the tax base is virtually non-existent, and very little can be done by the towns to help themselves. This makes them dependent on government, whose policies when forthcoming have been seen to be more a source of the problem than the solution. The inevitable conclusion is that at the heart of any approach to urban policy must lie an economic development strategy. That strategy must recognize the comparative advantages of the various Bedouin towns and the potential linkages with other cities in the Negev and nationally that can be exploited. It must also provide guidance as to how to realize them. While not a sufficient solution – there is still a need for a variety of services that are directly financed by the government

– it appears that it is a necessary first step to catalyze a process of fundamental change.

We have examined the circumstances of the towns in some depth, and have concluded that it is possible, at a surprisingly low cost, to identify and implement such an approach that fits the unique circumstances of the Bedouin towns. We have called that approach a Strategic Development Plan, and it is more fully presented in the accompanying monograph (*Strategy*). In this report, we present the broad outlines of that plan, to see if in fact it meets the needs and wishes of the community.

Existing Potential for Economic Development

Have the Bedouin towns been provided with preconditions for development? Clearly not. Virtually none has organized economic activity of any sort. Our evidence indicates that government officials and public policy actively discourage such activity, for what must be seen as short sighted and regressive reasons. The towns were formed and continue to grow because of major population pressure resulting from record birth rates and the removal of Bedouins from government-desired lands in the Negev. But unlike the Jewish towns, this population has few outlets. Young Bedouins cannot easily find work in the relatively stagnant Negev, and much less so in the dynamic center of Israel. Extended family ties make the latter sort of move more unattractive in any event. The towns have little to attract industry on their own. They have not even been granted the status of class A development zones for receiving tax relief for new industrial investments (under the Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investments), despite the fact that they are the poorest and most underdeveloped in the country.

In effect, they are little more than residential suburbs. But Rahat, with well over 30,000 persons, is or will soon be the second largest city in the Negev, after Beer Sheva. The next largest Bedouin town, Tel Sheva is also of sufficient size (over 10,000) that it too cannot merely serve exclusively as a suburban residential area. In both cases, size and complexity of their socio-demographic structures militate against it. An example of their inadequacy as urban places is that despite a large number of consumers, neither city is capable of meeting much of their normal requirements. Residents are obliged to do most of their shopping outside, in Beer Sheva and in the territories.

It was thought that the towns might play the role of service centers at least to their (Bedouin) hinterland. But the rural hinterland consists of small, widely dispersed settlements based in large part on subsistence agriculture, providing low incomes

and hence little effective consumer demand. Efforts could have been made to link the towns themselves to create a Bedouin urban subsystem but the towns were placed too far apart. Moreover, they each have so little economic activity that there is little to warrant other than the most modest of exchanges amongst themselves. Adjacent Jewish towns are still too small for most meaningful economic linkages, and Omer has pursued policies that have alienated rather than integrated Tel Sheva. Beer Sheva and to a lesser extent Dimona and Arad are the only important if somewhat inaccessible focal points and to a very limited extent they play that role for employment and shopping, but not for most other economic linkages, especially of a business-to-business sort.

Is a Development Approach Feasible for the Bedouin Towns?

With improved transportation and due recognition of the need for appropriate business linkages and a dynamic economic base the existing towns could service a much larger internal population as well as their exploding peripheries. Rahat and Tel Sheva are of a size and at locations that, with appropriate policies, they could rapidly commence a process of economic transformation. With effective linkages, these towns could also transmit their developmental dynamism to the other towns. In a similar way, by aggressively building on their own advantages, each of the smaller towns can reinforce the overall dynamism of the Bedouin urban system, benefiting all thereby. Our proposed plans, below, demonstrate the mutual benefits of a comprehensive, integrated planning approach that involves all the Bedouin towns.

However important it is to push for development of the Bedouin towns themselves, it is not enough. It is a necessary but not sufficient basis for their successful transformation. Development plans for these towns will succeed in large measure to the extent that they can be integrated into the larger economy of the Negev. Admittedly, the Negev economy is weak, and it must therefore become the locale of a major, national economic development initiative, with the focus on Beer Sheva. Such an initiative must abandon the half-baked, random efforts of the past and itself constitute a well-planned strategy. It is therefore in the Bedouin towns' own self-interest to fully support more determined efforts to develop the Beer Sheva Metropolitan region. To maximize the benefits, as part of their planning, the Bedouin towns must develop stronger linkages, most importantly with Beer Sheva. They must plug into the nascent high tech sector wherever possible, and must be active partners in the development of the region's infrastructure. Most important,

they must help promote the many infrastructure projects that will transmit the dynamism of the center of the country to the Negev.

Is a Development Approach Acceptable?

Before going into the details, it is important to consider the issue of acceptability. That is necessary because while there may be debate about the details of a plan, unless there is widespread support for the principle of urban development as articulated above, there is no chance for any relevant plan to get off the ground. With broad acceptance, differences over details can be contained and focused, without undermining the broad thrust of a major initiative.

There are two basic groups whose interests must be satisfied, the Bedouins themselves, and the Jewish majority. In addition, technical considerations, such as cost, timing and management further determine the acceptability of any policy initiative.

a. Acceptability to the Bedouin Community

Our research convinces us that an urban development initiative that holds out the promise of improvement will be acceptable to the vast majority of urban Bedouins. However much they value their traditional ways, the younger members of the community who are the majority also value what successful modernization and urbanization have to offer. Unfortunately the current urban framework in which they live has proven to be about the worst of all worlds. It offers few of the advantages of an urban life style, which the young crave, with all those negative consequences that have proven to be harmful to their tradition that is clung to lovingly by the elderly. For example, increased crowding and more education with few job prospects creates urban dysfunction in the form of crime and abuse and family breakdown that need not be the only urban model. Progressive towns capable of offering real jobs to men and women and higher family incomes will enable the most significant aspects of the tradition to be better preserved or adapted under generally positive circumstances.

A strong economic base will mean higher tax sources for the municipal authorities, and more local services for the community – better schools, recreation, cultural activities, etc. Local Bedouin leaders do not wish to turn the clock back in the towns, but rather to see a fulfillment of the potential that urban life with a Bedouin flavor has to offer. We believe that regardless of their political orientation and local

base, elected Bedouin officials and their professional staff will see in such a plan a means by which to rebuild confidence in them by their citizens.

b. Acceptability to the Jewish Community

The Jewish community at virtually all levels poses a more serious challenge to the proposed approach. In the first instance, the neighboring communities would be strongly opposed to any development that requires more land, since many of them lay claim to and now use those lands. For comparable-sized towns, the amount of land per capita is somewhat greater in the Jewish towns. As the Bedouin towns are growing much faster, their relative land deficits will increase rapidly. Many of the lands adjacent to Bedouin towns are owned by kibbutzim and moshavim, and their regional councils. With the decline of national agriculture generally, to be hastened by the growing water shortage, reallocation of some of these lands would seem to be feasible, and proper compensation should ensure no severe resistance.

There will also be those Jews who argue that we must first attend to Jewish problems especially in the problematic development towns of the Negev – Ofaqim, Netivot, Yeroham, etc. It is true that by Jewish standards these towns are problematical, and require attention. But as is the case for the Bedouin towns, a major contributor to their transformation will be the strengthening of the Beer Sheva economy, and building stronger linkages to it. Many of those links could benefit the Bedouin towns as well, so that some of the most important policy thrusts need not be presented as a zero sum situation. The debate must not be framed as competition for assistance between Jewish and Bedouin towns in the Negev. Those fallacious arguments have done much to aggravate already serious friction between the communities. The issue is more properly viewed as disparities between the Negev as a whole and the richer parts of the country. Assisting Bedouin towns does not detract from the Jewish towns of the Negev, but is part of repaying a long overdue obligation on the part of the nation as a whole to the Negev as a whole.

c. The Issue of Cost

As is always the case, those responsible for the nation's finances will contend that any such initiative cannot be afforded at this time. Two basic points to the contrary must be made. The first is that the argument about timeliness is always raised in the case of the Bedouins and it is no longer credible. By any standard of justice and equity, the Bedouins as full citizens of Israel have a right to a quality of urban life equivalent to that of their fellow Jewish citizens. The new city of Modi'in, with a population fast approaching that of the entire Bedouin urban population, was not told that fiscal constraints would prevent its receiving very costly services at

public expense and at the highest possible standards. Moreover, since the reasons for the disadvantages of the Bedouins are to a large extent the result of ill-advised and discriminatory national policies, they should not be asked to bear the extra burden of waiting for redress.

The bill will be a large one, but as we have argued, much of it will of necessity go to financing the development of the Negev as a whole, which is long overdue. The costs of most available proposals, which frighten treasury officials, tend to be overstated, based as they are on the prevailing model of dependency, in which the patron state is expected to pay the entire cost. Not surprisingly, and perhaps intentionally, these proposals tend to fall on deaf ears. We strongly believe that the most effective policies are those that encourage citizens to act in their own self interest using as much of their own (in this case limited) financial and human resources as possible. Public decisions that eliminate artificial barriers, that encourage activities that in the end generate income and hence tax revenues, and that encourage new sources of saving and foreign capital inflows are capable of effecting major changes at much lower budgetary cost.

We propose adopting precisely those sorts of policies as a way to avoid scaring off the defenders of the public purse. Israel has not often been creative about such devices, but in recent years, when fiscal discipline has begun to reign, and private entrepreneurs in high tech have succeeded without state slush funds, their efficacy has been demonstrated. In the case of the Bedouins, who have been made even more dependent on state handouts than most, weaning them away will be more difficult, but we believe it is doable. We would go farther, and say it is essential, to reshape attitudes towards independence, risk taking and innovation that are critical to trigger and then sustain the development of their economic base.

d. Management Capacity

A major barrier to successfully pursuing a strategic development policy is a lack of managerial capacity, to conceive, manage, evaluate and adjust such a complex initiative. While this concern is often addressed to the Bedouin community, we are at least as concerned about the Jewish establishment, which has long held absolute control over Bedouin affairs. Any effective policy will require the full involvement of Bedouin managers at all levels, and this will entail some displacement of Jewish officials in the field and at head offices. They may possess more impressive credentials, but their record in doing the wrong thing efficiently suggests that the Bedouins may be less efficient, but they may be able to do the right thing. Nevertheless, officialdom will raise all sorts of objections to an approach that not only displaces them, but which raises serious questions about what they have been doing. There will be major opposition as a result. They must

be forced to debate in the open the merits and demerits of our approach, rather than hiding behind secret discussions and sealed files, and playing their infernal game of divide and rule. The time has come to involve Bedouins centrally in shaping their own future. Any initiative that fails to do so is not serious.

It is axiomatic that a major effort will be needed to create suitable Bedouin organizations and to train Bedouin officials. In Part III, we offer a number of proposals to initiate such steps immediately.

Preconditions for an Urban Development Plan

Having considered some of the problems in attempting to introduce a developmental approach for the Bedouin towns, and while not wishing to minimize them, we do not believe that they constitute fundamental barriers. As a result, we shall elaborate on some of the key project components of what we believe is a viable, practical, strategic approach to the future of the Bedouin towns. The prescriptions that follow are far from comprehensive. In the first place, a number of technical elements remain to be added to translate the strategic plan into a plan of action: individual project assessments, budgets, time lines, etc.

Even in the absence of a fully articulated urban development program for the Bedouin towns collectively and individually, a number of *preconditions* must be met to ensure that virtually any such initiative can proceed and upon which it can build. These preconditions are in any event required to meet pressing current needs, regardless of other developmental considerations. Moreover, they offer the possibility of relatively immediate benefits for only marginal additions to regional projects under way or being planned. In other words, the case for moving ahead immediately to establish or consolidate these preconditions is extremely strong. Our discussion therefore begins with an analysis of general *regional preconditions*, and then we turn in the following section to specifically *urban preconditions*.

Regional Preconditions

a. Regional Transportation

The spatial, social, cultural, economic and political fragmentation of this region of some 500,000 persons continues to prevent the Negev from mobilizing its latent developmental potential. A region of this size should be a more important contributor to the national economy than merely supplying chemicals from the Dead Sea and the plains above. But fragmented into a number of dysfunctional towns and detached rural settlements, it remains a drag on the economy, kept in a state of impoverishment and dependency by a steady inflow of non-productive investments and personal transfers. *No other component of infrastructure can be as effective in integrating the region into a viable economic entity as a regional transportation network.*

Although the last few years have witnessed modest improvements to *interregional linkages*, that is, between the Negev generally and the rest of the country there remain major gaps. One is an international airport that could connect the region's current and future economic base to the global economy. Particular emphasis on charter flights (especially for tourists going to the dynamic Dead Sea area) and on cargo would give the Beer Sheva facility a distinct function that would not conflict with the passenger services at Ben-Gurion Airport. In fact, it would help relieve the traffic pressure and environmental problems there. Promises have been made several times from the highest political levels to convert the airforce base at Nevatim, which is quite well situated, into a civilian facility. Nothing appears to be happening, however. In June of this year, more frequent, faster and better-scheduled trains to Tel Aviv were added. A new railway terminal in the center of Beer Sheva and adjacent to the central bus station opened in September, vastly increasing the benefits of the train service. This has been a very positive initiative. The new Trans-Israel Highway could help the Negev, but the link to Beer Sheva is slated for completion at some distant date in the future.

All these developments can, with modest modifications, be made to serve the Bedouin community as well. Slight re-routing of some lines (Trans-Israel Highway and the intercity rail line) or opening commuter stations could serve at least the larger towns, and the construction of facilities such as the airport could provide both short and long-term employment for Bedouin workers.

Transportation links *within the region* are no less essential for two reasons. One is to give the various disadvantaged communities in the Negev effective access to the interregional systems. The second is to integrate the diffuse segments of the Negev economy into a larger, more dynamic regional economic system. For the Bedouin towns, extending these linkages is especially critical to enable them to overcome the limitations imposed by their small size and wide dispersal.

The current intraregional public transportation links are confined to buses operating on increasingly congested, low speed roads, and servicing the major Jewish towns almost exclusively. At present, there are virtually no public transportation services for the Bedouin community, contributing in no small measure to their high rates of unemployment. How can one explain the fact that Egged provides service to remote Jewish settlements in the Negev, with only a handful of residents, most of whom have cars, while service to Bedouin towns, with thousands and even tens of thousands of residents, most of whom do not have cars, is said to be “uneconomic”? Our survey indicates a rather substantial potential market for such a service.

The region’s open spaces make it possible to acquire rights of way and to develop at low cost a high-speed inter city commuter network (HSCN) that could create both a much more fully integrated regional labor market and an overall regional economic system. A regional rail-based mass transit system is referred to in the Metropolitan Beer Sheva plan but several difficulties are apparent. In the first place, the emphasis in the plan is on an internal rail system for the city of Beer Sheva. Work on that segment has already begun, despite the fact that Beer Sheva is already rather well served by a municipal bus system. Second, this urban rail system does not appear to be designed to serve the city’s major industrial zones, suggesting a bias against blue-collar commuters. Finally, the critical public transportation gap in the region, service to the outlying regions of the Metropolitan area, will not be addressed for at least two decades. As for the Bedouin towns, other than Rahat (and possibly Arara though it is not made explicit) the Bedouin towns simply do not appear in the transportation plans.

It is gratifying that the plans for regional public transit emphasize a rail system. On environmental and energy saving grounds alone, the case is a strong one. More important, a rail-based system will help Beer Sheva avoid the urban transportation nightmare that has befallen Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. It would be preferable, however, to modify the Beer Sheva plans, both in terms of orientation and of timing, to enable the Bedouin communities to participate fully and early in the benefits such a system has to offer.

First and foremost, we would advocate the modification of the existing inter city rail system so that all the Bedouin towns may be served by a commuter system in the near rather than distant future. In the *Urban Development Strategy Monograph*, we sketch the elements of such a network. (Fig. 3)

The proposed system would consist of three main lines radiating from the Beer Sheva terminus:

- *Northwest* to Lehavim and Rahat, and extended, via Qama junction to Qiryat Gat to link the region to the important and expanding Intel facility. This line already exists. The Rahat Lehavim Station would serve Laqiya as well.
- *Southeast* to Dimona via Tel Sheva, Segev Shalom and Arara. This rail line also exists. The Tel Sheva station would serve Omer.
- *Northeast* via Omer to Shoqet Junction, Hura, Kseifa and Arad with a future extension to the Dead Sea. This branch would tie in to the successful Omer Industrial Park, and the proposed (but dormant) Free Processing Zone and Shoqet Commercial-Industrial Park. A station at Shoqet would serve Laqiya, Metar and Hura.

These three lines would serve a suburban population of some 150,000 urban and another 50,000 rural residents at present. That population is already larger than that of the city of Beer Sheva, and is expected to grow much faster, doubling over the next two decades. The HSCN would bring the furthest reaches of the Metropolitan area, including its successful suburbs of Lehavim, Metar and Omer, within a 15-minute trip to the capital with its important service, shopping and employment nodes.

What is of concern is the stated intent to defer the regional transportation component of the Metropolitan Beer Sheva Plan for two decades, while Beer Sheva's light rail system (LRC) is built. We do not see any conflict between the two. Indeed there is great synergy between them. The regional plan extends the economic reach of Beer Sheva, making it a true metropolis, and an (expanded) Beer Sheva LRC would make the diverse attraction points within the region's capital city accessible to the farthest reaches of the Metro area. To achieve this synergy, and maximize profitability, the two projects should be constructed immediately and simultaneously. The only grounds for deferring the regional system might appear to be those of cost. However, the HSCN offers major incremental benefits to those plans at modest cost. (*Strategy*, Appendix 5.1) The two largely *in situ* lines of the proposed HSCN could be up and running in less than one year if it were made a priority, with the new third line completed in an additional two years.

If the cost of laying track for the northeast line is a short run barrier, we would propose that the right of way be acquired immediately in any event, and that an interim paved roadway be built along its length. A bus system could be operated on these exclusive lanes until the resources required to lay track along that right of way can be found. Such a system (express buses to the suburbs) has worked with impressive results in North America (*Strategy*, Appendix 5.1).

The implementation of the HSCN even in its interim, hybrid form may take time. To begin solving the underlying problem of local transport, we propose to launch immediately a distinct private company designed to serve the Bedouin community. With Egged lines now being “privatized”, such a decision is timely. The mandate of the proposed Bedouin Transit Company (BTC) will be to provide regular, efficient service as needed between all the Bedouin towns, from the rural areas to the towns, and from the towns to the larger Jewish cities, especially but not exclusively Beer Sheva. Bedouin entrepreneurs will run the BTC and it will employ mainly Bedouin drivers, office staff, etc. drawn from all seven towns. The head offices and garages, repair and maintenance services, etc. should be located in the Bedouin town best able to provide them at present, probably Hura (see below). We do not expect the BTC to receive any special treatment, but in the name of equity, we fully expect that it will receive the same per capita subsidy as does Egged for its remote routes. That is, the subsidy for servicing Laqiya and Hura should be the same as the current subsidy for Metar and Lehavim, not to mention Othniel. As part of its mandate the BTC would also be authorized to provide school bus service, ambulances and any other form of public transportation that would tie the communities closer together.

What makes the proposed BTC arrangement attractive is that it requires no major fixed investment other than the rolling stock (buses, etc.). If after the first five year contract term the HSCN is in place, as we propose, the BTC service can be reoriented to running feeder services to the stations, maintaining service to the emerging rural villages, operating the stations and the park and ride facilities, and continuing with the other, non-commuting services already noted.

A detailed project analysis and business plan is still required to determine the parameters of the BTC service, once the idea is adopted as part of the overall policy package. We believe the analysis, which can be done quickly, will demonstrate that such an initiative can and should be commenced almost immediately.

b. Communications

Communications is one area where current deficiencies can be translated into a distinct advantage. In the absence of sufficient reliable line-based telephone services, the Bedouin communities (including the more remote rural sectors) can be more effectively integrated into the modern economy of Israel via wireless communications. Wireless telephone service is already available in the community and will spread rapidly as costs continue to fall. Important new wireless services are already on the market, such as internet/e-mail, paging, faxing, etc. We propose that a low cost pilot project, in cooperation with a major innovative company in the field and in the Negev, such as Motorola, or newcomers like Nortel, Nokia or Ericsson, could provide benefits all around. The Bedouin community, including the non-urbanized, might well find new economic niches.

We are particularly enthusiastic about the role Bedouin women might play, as the new technology can accommodate the preference of a large number of them to remain at home, while offering the potential to engage in rewarding tasks from their homes. The successful weaving cooperative based in Laqiya could vastly improve its efficiency through such wireless linkages. The Italian Benetton model of decentralized production with exacting quality control via interactive communication is highly relevant. One or more of the Bedouin towns could become Israel's call center facility. These centers field all sorts of calls to 1-800 numbers from across the country from customers requiring information and guidance. They are used by private and public enterprises, from airlines to banks and manufacturing firms to catalog providers. Their advantage is that they free up head office staff from dealing with essentially routine matters. This service is a rapidly expanding one combining low cost labor with modern technology, and has, in the case of New Brunswick in Atlantic Canada, provided a major stimulus for the region's economy.

From the perspective of a firm like Motorola, success in enabling new opportunities for such a community would open the doors to the billions of persons in the third world for whom wireless communications will be essential if they are to advance. (As we were going to press, Hewlett-Packard announced a 1 billion dollar program along these lines for developing countries) The technology could be diffused almost immediately to the rest of the Middle East, which has communications problems very similar to those of the Bedouin towns. As part of a regional peace project, this initiative could gain rapid endorsement and appears to hold out a key leading-edge role for the Bedouin community.

c. Energy

In the absence of abundant domestic fossil fuels, the cost of energy in Israel remains extremely high. That makes acquiring it a serious problem for Bedouins in particular, not only for domestic purposes, but also for any businesses they may wish to develop. The energy market in Israel is driven by the wealthier segments with their western style cars and air conditioners, and this appears to have retarded the development of alternative energy sources. We believe there is scope for important new technologies that provide low cost energy for the sorts of needs the Bedouin community at present has – cooking, heating and cooling, small scale industry, intensive (hot house) agriculture, local, small scale water supply desalination and recycling, etc.

The solar energy researchers at Ben-Gurion University's Desert Research Institute at Sde Boqer and innovative companies such as Ormat could, with modest public support, work towards practical solutions for this latent market. Japanese companies have developed batteries (or hybrid systems) for cars that appear to be competitive and are already on the market. Fuel cell technology is beginning to take off, as companies such as Ballard Power Systems Inc, United Technologies, Avista Labs and FuelCell Energy Co. all are competing to get to market with their diverse alternatives in the near future. An effort to adapt these new possibilities for local public transportation, farm vehicles, and the like would link the Bedouins to leading edge technological advances. Again, the pent-up demand in poorer countries where western appliances are neither affordable nor appropriate appears to be unlimited. We propose to encourage an initiative to develop a Bedouin model of alternative (and clean) energy. (see selected materials in *Strategy*, Appendix 5.2)

d. Investing in Human Capital

Creating jobs for Bedouins provides only one component of an employment solution. The other immediate precondition is to create a literate and disciplined work force that can not only do the jobs, but do them well and productively so as to ensure the future of the Bedouin economy and hence its own future. We have noted the dismal state of *formal* Bedouin education, and other official reports (such as the Katz report) are fully consistent with our conclusions. For Bedouin development to become a reality, a major initiative in education for the Bedouin sector is required without further delay. It is in everyone's interest that Bedouin society be strengthened to better cope with the challenges of modernization and urbanization. Failure to do so is already taking a heavy toll in the form of an increasingly alienated and hostile youth population.

The many studies and reports on Bedouin education essentially agree on what has to be done, ranging from a dramatic increase in the number of trained teachers to improving the qualifications of existing teachers, upgrading facilities and working

to reduce dropouts. We have seen very high educational payoff to even modest programs such as integrating Bedouins into the college and university framework.

In addition to formal education, we would stress that *training programs* are required to provide on-the-job practical skills for the proposed economic base. A technical college primarily but not exclusively for Bedouins, located in one of the larger towns but closely linked to branches in at least a few of the other towns is urgently required. Mathematics, computer skills, business finance, management training and fluency in English are essential prerequisites to success in the modern world, and a cohort of teachers specially trained to teach in these fields must be created from now.

There will have to be creative innovations to convey such material to this community. The *Budding Scientists* program at Ben-Gurion University is an excellent example of the sort of innovative programs that have been enthusiastically embraced by the Bedouin community. In addition, distance learning solutions would appear to be uniquely appropriate, especially for Bedouin women, and Israel's Open University has been a pioneer in this field.

e. The Other Side of the Coin: Creating Jobs

A word of caution is required, however. It is popular to advocate massive investment in education as the sole human resource strategy. Without simultaneously putting in place a developmentally oriented economic strategy, this solution will in short order make matters worse, adding to the already large and rapidly growing number of graduates who are unable to find suitable work. After major personal investments, of time and limited family resources, in their education, this cohort is if anything more alienated than the rest of the community, and will increasingly channel that frustration into radical protest. Education raises expectations, and ensuring that they can realistically be met is of utmost importance to a serious development strategy.

f. Mobilization of Financial Capital

One of the major reasons that there are insufficient jobs is that Negev businesses in general, and Bedouin businesses in particular have great difficulty raising investment funds, as our *Survey* confirms. Governments discriminate against Bedouin businessmen in providing investment grants, and private banks refuse to lend to them. We propose to investigate the feasibility of launching a Bedouin Development Bank, modeled after similar banks in the Third World. The purpose of such banks is to provide loans for business to expand employment, rather than emphasizing loans to consumers as traditional banks do. We will seek assistance in

the planning of such a facility from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. By guaranteeing these development loans, the Government of Israel could, at low cost, do for the Bedouin community what the United States did for Israel during the early 1990s. The purpose would be to attract savings from the community, however modest they may be to start with, along with foreign investors with an interest in advancing the status of Bedouins. The funds would be used to provide loans to small and middle-sized enterprises. This category of firm has been among the fastest growing everywhere, and tends to employ the largest numbers of workers.

For very small businesses, there is the model of the well-known Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, which provides small amounts of financing, mainly for rural enterprises, and with a heavy emphasis on developing women entrepreneurs. A small research team has already been formed to explore the relevance of this idea for the Bedouin urban community.

g. Obtaining Government Investment Assistance

Bedouin towns are not designated to receive favorable government treatment of the sort provided to other towns. In particular, they do not receive Class A status under the Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investment, which provides significant tax relief for firms investing in such towns. There is no reason for this exclusion, and as Table 1 indicated, by the government's own measures these towns are most in need.

h. Developing the Negev Economy

Only the successful transformation of *the Negev region as a whole*, and in particular its Beer Sheva Metropolitan core, can provide sufficient dynamic opportunities to fundamentally alter the Bedouin urban reality. Such a transformation of the Negev also requires a comprehensive package of integrated initiatives rather than relying on one single measure. In the past, a number of policy initiatives were concocted to advance such a comprehensive, developmental orientation: the Metropolitan Beer Sheva Plan and a variety of Negev development initiatives (e.g. Kidmat Ha'Negev). The role the Bedouin community might play is occasionally raised in these plans, but is never seriously strategized. What is gaining popularity at the moment are a number of individual pet projects, which if not capable of the grandiose transformation they claim, could at least provide some direct and/or indirect spin-off benefits for the Bedouin towns. Despite public commitments, only one or two have gone beyond the talking or vague political promise stage. Rarely are Bedouin towns even mentioned in these plans. The train passes near many of the towns as does the planned route #6, but no access to the

towns is contemplated. Nevatim airport is being discussed as if Tel Sheva, Arara and Kseifa do not even exist. The Omer Industrial Park is being expanded without a hint that it is almost across the street from Tel Sheva and close to Segev Shalom, Hura and Laqiya. It employs no Bedouins. Rapid transit in Beer Sheva is being planned without any link to some of its larger suburbs.

All regional and metropolitan developmental initiatives should include a clear indication of the Bedouin role generally and that of each town specifically. Expected benefits for the Bedouin community should be a necessary element from the earliest, project analysis (cost-benefit) stage. For the Bedouins to benefit, one cannot merely assume that what is good for the Negev will be good for them. Their status is too tenuous to assure that result. Rather, all such policy initiatives must specify explicitly the means by which the Bedouin community can participate and benefit, and that has never been the case. For greater synergy, these initiatives should be launched in close cooperation with our plans for the Bedouin urban sector.

i. Basic Health and Social Services

Our analysis confirms the current deficiencies in these fields, strongly evidenced in our interviews and our *Survey*, and reported upon time and again by official agencies and by objective researchers.^{viii} Since all of Israel's official "development towns" receive favorable treatment in these fields, as well as in education, the exclusion of the Bedouin towns is unacceptable. Again, on purely humanitarian and moral grounds, national service standards must be met for the Bedouin community, and immediately. No excuses, no delays. Moreover, these services are essential for the building of a healthy, secure community, which can contribute to expanding, rather than drawing down, society's resources as its economy develops. Issues about the delivery of these services, to ensure high quality, invariably encounter the shortage of Bedouin professionals in these fields. The obvious lesson is that investments in training more Bedouin professionals are of the highest priority. Ben-Gurion University's program to bring Bedouin women into the university framework has been extraordinarily successful, and is already beginning to fill this gap. Much more work with the University is required to find ways to greatly increase access by Bedouins to the new growth fields of engineering, science, computer programming, biology, etc. Government funding of scholarships is an absolute necessity.

Urban Preconditions

The region-wide preconditions discussed above are basic building blocks for any effort to develop the individual towns. In this section, we turn to those local preconditions that are more narrowly conceived as serving an urban development strategy.

a. Equal Standards for Urban Infrastructure

Cities are either productive or unproductive in large measure as a function of the efficacy of their internal physical infrastructure (e.g. paved roads, sidewalks, sewers, and public transportation into the heart of the community). We have already established in Part I that, due to inequities in funding, the Bedouin towns have severe deficiencies in virtually all aspects of their infrastructure. The result is that many firms find the Bedouin towns incapable of meeting their infrastructure requirements, and are obliged to locate elsewhere. Similarly, educated young Bedouin couples who are tomorrow's leaders often find the conditions of public spaces unacceptable and choose to live elsewhere. An attractive house is not enough for raising one's family if the street is filthy, the sidewalks broken, work is inaccessible, water supply is intermittent, no parks are available, schools are of poor quality, and crime is rife.

Therefore, improving this urban infrastructure is clearly an immediate requirement. But it is no less vital that a modern urban infrastructure be seen in its totality as a precondition for urban development. Patching things up is not enough. The existing infrastructure must be improved and maintained and new infrastructure must be planned to facilitate the expected rapid growth of these communities.

New infrastructure is also required, to meet needs other than those of a growing population. It must serve as an incentive to attract those kinds of activities upon which the city's economic development will be based. Such infrastructure includes suitably laid out industrial sites, specialized water and energy supplies, high quality communications networks, and the like. It is inappropriate for the various government ministries to use boiler plate plans for infrastructure that completely disregard the unique nature of Bedouin settlements in general, and the potential specialized economic role of each of the towns in particular. We propose that all future infrastructure plans serve to facilitate the implementation of the adopted urban development strategy. This might include building bus and/or train stations, providing proper sites for educational institutions, planning integrated community center facilities, laying out research parks, enabling cables for high speed communications, and so forth.

b. Providing Land for Urban Expansion

Several of the Bedouin towns have the potential to expand, but lack the land to do so, owned as it is by the state or by kibbutzim or other interests. Land must be made available to allow the Bedouin towns to grow normally and healthily. The case of Omer's expansion at the expense of its Bedouin neighbor, Tel Sheva, is illustrative of the double standards that currently prevail. Only by having available sufficient serviced industrial sites will the Bedouin towns be able to achieve scale economies and industrial clusters necessary to help fuel economic development. And only with an adequate supply of residential lots that are affordable will the towns be able to accommodate the expected population pressures. It should be noted that the provision of these lands is not a budgetary cost to the state, merely a shift in the allocation priorities of the Israel Lands Administration.

c. Access Roads

An infrastructure problem facing all Bedouin towns is the poor quality of road access. Rahat and Tel Sheva in particular cannot at present be approached directly from main highways, which lengthens all trips to other towns and to Beer Sheva considerably and unreasonably. In addition, other than Rahat, which has two entry roads into town, all other towns have only one, which is unduly restrictive. Immediate efforts are required to plan more access roads that will also benefit the individual development requirements of each town.

d. Housing

Although the government has approved modest transfers of funds to families moving into the towns, recalcitrant officials occasionally withhold even these funds. Such funds should be released, and much of the decision-making regarding housing should be left to individuals. Such an approach will lead to the creation of suitable living arrangements for a community with distinctive needs and tastes in housing. Regrettably, in the past and in most situations, housing planned from above has been given priority.

e. External Land

The issue of land ownership outside the towns remains a thorn, and perhaps the major thorn, in relations between Bedouins and the State. It has been extensively studied, and continues to defy easy solutions. We have avoided this issue because the former minister responsible for Bedouin affairs, Haim Oron, has proposed a very reasonable approach. It allows us to sidestep the issue while getting on with an urban development policy. He advocated a clear separation between the ownership and the service provision issues. By tying the two together, that is, refusing to provide services until the land issue is resolved (to their satisfaction),

the government authorities have managed to deprive Bedouins of some of their basic rights. Many of the most distasteful public actions – uprooting tribes, demolishing homes, restricting livestock, and denying basic services - are direct consequences of this linkage. Since our proposed development strategy is focused on the issue of service provision, we need not await the resolution of the land title issue to begin implementing Oron’s approach.

f. Investing in Community

All communities in Israel should be provided with at least basic amenities. And they should be funded on an equitable basis, guaranteed via complete openness for inspection. It has been demonstrated (*Local Finance*) that Bedouin towns receive much lower levels of public transfers than comparable Jewish and Arab towns. Their ongoing complaints about injustice are simply ignored by the authorities, and the legal system appears to be incapable of meting out justice. The result is that the Bedouin towns are lacking in recreational, cultural and sports facilities that are most urgently required. Creative means can be found whereby the community itself takes responsibility for planning and organizing such activities, assisted by financial support from the government.

g. Urban Governance

No amount of planning can by itself make a city “work”. That requires municipal leadership of the highest order, including dedicated elected officials committed to reform, talented professionals and a broadly based desire for good government. In the space of a few years, based on such a reform orientation, the city of Yeroham in the Negev was able to transform itself from having about the worst level of academic performance to near the very best. Building constructive coalitions from all communities, and from business, labor and the professions, is an important foundation for launching and sustaining a reform program. The low level of public esteem for local government in the Bedouin sector makes the search for vastly improved governance a major priority in all the towns.

Table 2: Infrastructure Components of an Urban Development Strategy

a. Regional Infrastructure

				Time Considerations (Years)	
STRATEGIC PROJECTS	Priority	Assignment	Cost Category	To Start	To Completion +
REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE					
Transport					
<u>Inter-regional</u>					

Rail - Upgrade Service, Stations	A	Gov	Modest	1	2
Trans-Israel Highway (Rte #6)	C	Gov/Priv	High	2	8
Reroute					
Civilian Airport Nevatim	A	Gov/Priv	High	2	3
Intra-regional					
BTC	A	Priv/Gov	Low	0	1
Interim: Busways + Rail	A	Gov	Modest	1	1
Longer Term: HSCN	C	Gov (BOT)	Modest	2	2
Access Roads to Towns	A	Gov/Loc	Modest	1	1
Regional Development Initiative					
Integrated Development Plan with Bedouin Roles	A	Gov	High	2	5
Communications					
Wireless Applications	B	Gov/Priv	Low	0	1
Call Center	A	Priv	Low	1	1
Energy					
Alternatives	B	Gov/Priv/Res	Low	0	ongoing
Research/Experiments					
Human Capital					
Formal Education - Katz Report	A	Gov	High	0	5
Informal Ed. - Colleges	A	Gov	Modest	0	3
- Distance Learning	B	Gov/Uni	Modest	1	2
Investment Incentives					
Designate All Towns as Class "A"	A	Gov	Zero	0	1
Financial Capital					
Create a Bedouin Development Bank	B	Gov/Intl/Priv	Low	2	1
Human and Social Services					
Equal Standards	A	Gov	Modest	0	1
Investment in Professionals	A	Gov/Uni	Low	1	2
Assign Appropriate Status (Zone A)	A	Gov	Zero	0	1

*Table 2: Infrastructure Components of an Urban Development Strategy
b. Urban Infrastructure and Common Projects*

				Time Considerations (Years)	
STRATEGIC PROJECTS	Priority	Assignment	Cost Category	To Start	To Completion +
URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE AND COMMON PROJECTS					
Land and Services					

Equal Standards	B	Gov	Modest	0	2
Infrastructure for Economic Development	A	Gov	Modest	0	3
Infrastructure for Population Growth	A	Gov/Loc	High	1	2
Access Roads to Towns	A	Gov	High	1	2
Land for Expansion	A	ILA/Courts	Low	0	2
Human Capital					
Job Registry	B	Gov/Priv	Low	0	1
Job Fair	C	Loc/Gov	Low	1	2
Industrial Park Sites	A	Loc/Gov	Modest	1	2
Business Incubators	B	Gov/ICN/Uni	Modest	1	1
Entrepreneurial Training	B	Gov/Priv	Low	1	1
Youth Training Centers	A	Gov	Low (5 years)	1	1
Mentoring	A	Priv	Low	0	1
Networking Programs (Cisco/Sun)	A	Priv	Low	1	1
Social Capital					
Housing	C	Gov/Priv	Low	1	2
Community Facilities	B	Gov/Local	Low	0	3

Agricultural Opportunities					
Experimental Programs	A	Gov	Modest	0	2
Intensive Agriculture	B	Gov	High	2	2
Incorporation in School Curriculum	A	Gov/Local	Low	1	1
Urban Governance					
Reform Coalition Building	A	Loc	Low	0	1

Notes: Priority A is highest priority. Assignments to Gov (Government of Israel); Priv (Private Agents); Res (Research Bodies); Uni (Universities); Intl (International); Local (Local Governments), ILA (Israel Land Authority).

In Table 2, we summarize the various infrastructure projects that we are advocating. We provide in the table, a suggested assignment of responsibilities and our initial expectations about the order of magnitude of the costs that will be entailed and the time frames involved.

Elements of an Urban Development Strategy

In the foregoing, we identified a number of regional and urban *preconditions*, which if met will greatly facilitate the effective development of the Bedouin urban system. Formulating and then implementing a specifically urban development strategy will be no less challenging. The following section spells out key project components of such a development strategy.

We begin with a variety of projects that are likely to benefit all or at least most of the town. These are summarized in Table 2. We then consider the potential role of each of the towns, reflecting its size, location and actual and potential advantages. Appendix 1 provides a tabular summary of the results of this analysis, and is referred to throughout this discussion.

a. Common Projects

A number of projects can benefit the majority of the towns, in particular in the fields of manpower development and agriculture. With respect to manpower, the most important requirement is to close the gap between mainstream business and Bedouin urban businessmen and workers. A number of models for achieving this goal are already available in Israel, though they have not been introduced to the Bedouin sector. Among the most important initiatives we would propose are the following:

- There is an urgent need for training centers to bring urban youth into the productive labor force. Many of them, and probably the majority, received an inadequate education over the past decade and a half and many are unemployed and engaged in destructive activities. Improving the educational system will not benefit them. They must not be written off, and a major initiative to provide them with skills, discipline and motivation is required. Assuming the proposed educational initiatives are implemented, this project need have a finite life, say of 5 years, as it is aimed primarily at clearing the backlog of aimless youth. A center in one or two towns (Tel Sheva, Kseifa) may be sufficient for these purposes if adequate transportation facilities are provided, as we propose.
- The concept of business incubator (hamama) facilities created by the government for workers from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) will be adapted for the Bedouin communities. They have led to important innovations and business start-ups. It is true that the FSU community had a much stronger background in sciences and engineering. The sectoral emphasis for each town will have to be more appropriate to

its labor skills. This can include innovative, modern agriculture, modern approaches to construction, desert gardening, etc. We propose to approach neighboring kibbutzim to provide mentoring services in some of these areas to bring the level of technology up to best practices in Israel. We will also consult with the Applied Research Institute at Ben-Gurion University. The highly successful Initiative Center for the Negev could play a very useful role in the design and start-up of this facility, as it has for FSU immigrants.

- We plan to apply the lessons learned from Stef Wertheimer's creative program of entrepreneurial training at his Tefen Industrial Park. We propose to try to persuade him to use his new Omer Park to encourage such advancement by a modest number of Bedouins.
- One program that has been initiated in Israel with encouraging success is that of mentoring. In these programs, staff of a successful business meets regularly with a small cohort of disadvantaged youth, and imparts to them a sense of purpose, some skills, and offers the possibility of finding work in their firm(s). We will approach firms in the Omer Industrial Park, as well as in Beer Sheva, Dimona, Ramat Hovav and Arad to run this sort of program on a trial basis, with some promising senior high school girls and boys from the nearby towns of Tel Sheva, Segev Shalom, Arara, and Kseifa. This program could take place within the training centers, above, but we would encourage the firms to open up their doors and engage in as much on-site training as possible. Although small in scale, it has enormous potential to develop a cohort of highly motivated future business leaders and role models among the town's younger community.
- An innovative type of training program has been recently undertaken in Israel by leading high tech firms, such as Cisco and Sun Microsystems. The Cisco program trains students to work as networking experts after two years of training and helps them prepare for electronics programs at university. Upon completion, jobs are waiting for them. As there is a great shortage of networking experts in the hi-tech industry, building this link will begin providing well-paying jobs for many youth of the Bedouin towns within two years. We propose to begin with two trial programs, in Hura and Laqiya.
- A job registry in the towns will help provide an updated file on available personnel, and a pilot project is already underway at the Center for Bedouin Studies and Development. A parallel marketing

strategy is required. We propose to establish annual or semi-annual job fairs in all the Bedouin towns. Firms in the region will be encouraged to come and present their needs and meet prospective employees. Over time, as business expands, fairs to promote local products and services will be added.

Turning to agriculture, there are significant potential benefits to be derived in many of the towns from a concerted and high-powered effort to modernize the agricultural base of the Bedouin economy. Given the background and traditions of the Bedouins, such a program will help maintain links to their agricultural roots. What we are proposing in particular are hi-tech applications for agriculture. That activity would be built around intensive agricultural sites such as the greenhouses that have been specially designed on the periphery of Rahat and Hura. Such a program will allow the Bedouins who wish to avoid industrial regimentation and to retain their ties to agriculture to do so on modest sized designated sites adjacent to their urban residences.

On the basis of an in-depth interview with Prof. Dov Pasternak of Ben-Gurion University's Institute of Applied Research^{ix} we are convinced that this strategy should be pursued. Naturally, such agriculture must address the constraints of the Negev region, which include a shortage of clean water, and limited amounts of recycled and underground sources. The most promising field appears to be the raising of sheep in a technologically sophisticated manner. Israel's innovations in the dairy industry have made it a world leader in efficiency and yields. Adapting lessons for sheep, using intensive rather than extensive means, can yield profitable quantities of dairy products, meat and wool. By importing feed, relatively small plots of land adjacent to the towns can be used effectively. Markets for a high quality product are very promising, not only within Israel among Jews and Moslems alike, but also in Gaza and the West Bank and in neighboring countries. Moreover, a large number of workers, including women who have always played an important role in raising sheep, can be gainfully employed.

Research in other fields suggests that there are selected windows of opportunity, such as the growth of decorative branches for the flower industry, certain fruits such as pomegranates, olives and figs that can be developed using the available supplies of water efficiently. Finally, selected specialties such as melons and asparagus might also prove to be viable.

All these are at an early stage of discussion, however, as no funds or organizations to do the basic research and development for a viable Bedouin urban-centered agriculture has ever been made available. We therefore propose the immediate

establishment of Regional Agricultural Research and Development Center (MOP), most likely in Segev Shalom, but with a second branch to be developed in Hura. It would be associated with a program in the high schools in all the Bedouin towns to provide education and training in advanced agricultural methods. Indeed the latter was proposed by the Katz committee, but was never acted upon. Israel has a number of world class experts, who teach these methods in every corner of the globe, but not to its own Bedouin community. It has been estimated that for a capital outlay of some one million dollars and with an annual operating budget of half a million, a viable program of experimental research with a teaching component could be launched. One important spin off is that youth from the unrecognized villages could also participate. Working with experts to design, fund, staff and implement such a program should be one of the first initiatives of the BUDA.

Some of the towns could additionally benefit by providing services to agriculture (repair of vehicles and irrigation equipment, banking and insurance) and inputs (fertilizer, feed) as well as dealing with outputs (packing and processing, storage). While more work is needed on the parameters of this approach, we believe that it is not only viable, but also highly appropriate. It could create hundreds if not thousands of valued jobs in lieu of the mostly menial jobs in agriculture now performed by Bedouins.

b. Rahat's Role: An Administrative Pole

On the basis of its dominant size alone, being home to more than half of the urbanized Bedouin population, Rahat would appear to be the logical choice as the dominant growth engine of the Bedouin urban sector. But its location at the northwestern periphery of the area of Bedouin settlement, remote from almost all Negev towns, might prove to be a serious constraint. It has no air link and a major effort is required to ensure that it does acquire suitable rail and highway access. A development strategy must therefore work on both fronts, that is, to ensure it has good access, but also to work on a developmental orientation that is less dependent on traditional locational factors.

Its location, close to the main North-South highway (#40) not far from where it intersects the Arad road (#31), places it at the gateway to the entire Negev. This would seem to be ideal, but the routing of the Trans-Israel Highway (Route #6) will, when completed over the next decade, tend to divert a portion of the traffic away from Rahat. It would be of inestimable assistance to Rahat's development if the alignment of the proposed Route #6 were modified to come closer to the town, with an interchange nearby. Such a change would require an alteration of highway construction plans, which has never been easy to achieve, and certainly not for the

Bedouins. But it is of the highest priority. Similarly, access to the railroad is vital. It would provide Rahat's workers with the opportunity to reach jobs at low cost throughout the Negev, but also in the dynamic Intel plant in Qiryat Gat, which would be no more than 20 minutes away.

Rahat would be well advised to advance parallel plans, both because of uncertainty regarding influencing infrastructure decisions, and because its size warrants more than a single strategic orientation. Most promising appears to be the focusing of efforts on its development as an *administrative* pole. For such a role in the 21st century, a city need not be very close to other urban areas. Communications offer an excellent substitute to many direct, interpersonal (face-to-face) and hence transportation-based linkages in these service-providing fields. The modern move towards decentralization facilitates this trend. Rahat's size ensures that it has a core internal market and labor supply to help provide administrative services. Already it has over 1200 workers in business and professional services. A summary of potential service functions to serve as the core of its economy follows. More details are provided in the *Strategy* monograph.

- a Bedouin community college, already underway and to be accelerated. Selected departments could eventually be devolved to other Bedouin towns and linked via the Internet. Courses should emphasize practical skills for unemployed young men and women.
- a second regional hospital, emphasizing Bedouin needs such as pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology. It will take pressure off Soroka and deliver services in Arabic and Hebrew, with a goal of employing largely Bedouin staff in time. Overcrowding at Soroka has already led to plans for a new hospital. This economic base could do for Rahat what Soroka has done for Beer Sheva. In its start up years, the hospital would be operated as a satellite of Soroka. One option is to locate the facility near the busy Bet Qama junction on Route #40. An alternative is on the new road that will join Lehavim, Rahat and Kibbutz Mishmar Ha'Negev. The latter location would make the facility easier to reach by residents of Laqiya, Hura and Metar in particular. Both sites could also serve the nearby Jewish and Bedouin rural settlements.
- head offices of the proposed Bedouin Urban Development Agency (BUDA), discussed below.
- offices of national government agencies (local courthouse, regional police headquarters, branches of the regional offices of the Ministries

of Health, Interior, Industry and Commerce, Housing, Education and Infrastructure) as well as relevant sections of Metropolitan Beer Sheva and other Negev agencies dealing with Bedouin affairs.

Rahat will have to develop commercial complements to its administrative base or it will stagnate. The proposed commercial center, jointly owned by Lehavim and Rahat, offers one important commercial base at the periphery of Rahat. Professional services such as those of lawyers, architects, accountants, engineers, and so forth would be accommodated in a centrally located, imaginatively conceived business center. These services would then serve to attract new businesses to the community. In Appendix 1 a), we list the core strategic projects for transforming Rahat into the administrative pole of the Bedouin urban system.

c. Tel Sheva's Role: An Economic Pole

The next largest town is Tel Sheva, at about one-third Rahat's population. It has the critical commercial advantage of greatest proximity to the other Bedouin towns, and is closest to Beer Sheva. As such, it is best situated to become the economic pole for the Bedouin towns. Some 18.5% of its labor force is already working in industry. Most of these jobs are now and will continue to be outside the town.

Special efforts will be made to find jobs for Tel Sheva's workers in the nascent but dynamic technological park of its neighbor, Omer. Prime Minister Barak's commitment to develop the Nevatim air base for civilian use as part of an overall economic development strategy for the Negev would clearly favor Tel Sheva, as would the development of the Free Processing Zone (FPZ) a few kilometers northwest of Omer. Acceleration of construction of the southern segment of the Trans Israel Highway (Route #6) to Beer Sheva would open Tel Sheva's linkages to the rest of the country as well. And the new and rapidly improving rail linkages can accelerate that trend. In all cases, improved access to these routes from Tel Sheva is required.

Making Tel Sheva an effective economic pole will be facilitated by major improvements in transportation links between Tel Sheva and the other Bedouin towns. The new Beer Sheva eastern bypass road already places Tel Sheva much closer to Segev Shalom. A short access road to that bypass road will be promoted to shorten the trip even more. The planned road to the Nevatim airport will situate Tel Sheva ideally to take advantage of that project by means of a spin-off industrial park. And it is already no more than 15 minutes drive, on good roads, to Laqiya and Hura.

At present Tel Sheva has only a few local firms beyond the small family retail enterprises that are found in all the Bedouin towns. That means that there is very little to build on, and development planning will have to begin almost from ground zero. There is no government agency capable of making the “right” choices of industry for the town. However, the government can do what it has done successfully for the absorption of immigrants from the Former Soviet Union and that is to work with the community to provide a business framework within which entrepreneurs and investors can identify opportunities and initiate enterprises. The following is a list of essential components of such a business framework.

- An industrial park of high quality is required to ensure that what is implanted are not primarily backward industries, but include a number that have the capacity to link to the more dynamic industries in the region and in the country. Tel Sheva’s park should be placed as close as possible to the new rail line to Beer Sheva, as well as to the new circumferential highway, and the proposed Trans-Israel Highway. A second park will be located on the proposed new road to the Nevatim airport. The latter will provide the community with a natural economic base related to cargo shipping, storage, handling and delivery, areas in which the city already has some activity. The parks will need sufficient space for expansion and high quality infrastructure.
- We do not advocate heavy emphasis on traditional industries such as textiles and foods that continue to be the government’s preferred sector for its Negev “development strategy” despite its obvious failure. What we require are industries that are linked to the new growth areas, although further along the product cycle, such as manufacturing of new products, services for new industries, etc. Over time, these sectors will survive and expand, and an increasing supply of skilled Bedouin workers will contribute to their advance. The experiences of Southeast Asia demonstrate just how quickly a once-deprived society can advance if it bases its development strategy on dynamic rather than retrograde sectors.
- Major efforts are needed immediately if Tel Sheva’s labor force is to be brought up to levels enabling such transformation. In particular, a training center and a mentoring program are required immediately. To help launch local businesses, an incubator should be initiated. An effort to locate potential entrepreneurs is already underway, and when completed, business plans will be prepared to facilitate the search for investment support.

Appendix 1 a) contains a summary of our strategic considerations for Tel Sheva as a potential economic growth pole for the Bedouin urban system.

d. Beyond the Pole: The Other Bedouin Towns

For the other towns, their relative advantages must also be identified, and appropriate linkages forged with external industries. It is possible to begin the process of transforming their respective economies in a strategic fashion almost immediately and the following are the indicated projects they should consider.

- As soon as the plan to develop the Nevatim airport as a civilian facility is initiated, proximate towns (Kseifa, Arara) can begin to engage in produce processing and packing while others would specialize in servicing the many vehicles that will be required for handling cargo and for transporting charter tourists. These in turn could lead, over time, to related ventures, in shipping in the one case, and to private car, bus and truck repairs in the other. The development of the airport site itself, and the provision of services for the facility once completed ought to include a significant proportion of Bedouin workers.
- There is scope for development of environmental industries in the Negev, most advantageously in Segev Shalom. Recycling remains an underdeveloped activity in Israel, but with growing environmental consciousness, it is bound to expand. A plastic recycling facility is already operational in nearby Ramat Hovav. Paper and glass should follow. Cleaning up the Negev environment is essential if this region is to have any prospect of attracting and retaining modern, footloose industries. Industries devoted to cleaning up, to the use of recycled products, and to producing non-polluting products have proven to be quite successful in more advanced countries.
- In addition, locational circumstances offer the towns the opportunity to be increasingly linked to other Jewish towns as well as Beer Sheva. Some cities provide important subregional linkages, such as Dimona for Arara, and Arad for Kseifa. Both cities have modest economic structures, but a study of their potential (Appendix 2) reveals opportunities for Bedouin towns that can be exploited. Arara will attempt to benefit from its proximity to the large and successful Dell-Vishay plant in Dimona,^x and its proximity to the Dead Sea Industries, the Rotem Plain industries and the Temed Hi-Tech

Industrial Park will enable it to find niches in related fields. Kseifa will target firms such as Motorola, and the tourist sectors of Arad and the rapidly growing Dead Sea area, around which to construct its economic base.

- Hura and Laqiya are close to Metar, which is at the moment only a bedroom community, but which has plans to develop a potentially valuable commercial-industrial site at Shoqet junction. Scope exists to create a unique joint venture, possibly also including the nearby kibbutzim of Lahav and Keramim. If the FPZ does go ahead, these two Bedouin towns, along with Tel Sheva are best situated to benefit from it. Meanwhile, they should both be making special efforts to tie in with the Omer industrial park.
- The rapid growth of Metar as well as Lehavim and Omer offers unique opportunities in the field of construction. To date, much of the industry is dominated by Jewish contractors who use largely low-paid, unskilled workers from abroad and from the territories to build houses of inferior quality. Several construction firms that are modeled on western practices, using skilled workers who are well paid to produce quality products should find a market in these affluent suburbs. A cooperative arrangement between Bedouin and Jewish partners (possibly a kibbutz), with profit sharing schemes to encourage employment stability and responsibility, will be explored as one vehicle along these lines. It is proposed that an incubator be set up in Hura to advance this idea.
- Segev Shalom is close to Beer Sheva, and will naturally wish to build ties there. It is also closest to the heavy industry site at Ramat Hovav, with which it already has some linkages. Its large agricultural hinterland will make agribusiness a very likely core of its economy. The proposed agricultural innovation program (MOP) would ideally be located there.

Having pointed out these opportunities, it must be added that to date, employment of Bedouins in industry has been very limited (Appendix 2). Remarkably, none are employed in the most advanced Hi-Tech Industrial Parks at Omer and Temed. And none are employed in the most advanced industries elsewhere (e.g. Motorola in Arad, and Dell-Vishay in Dimona). An investigation into the reasons for this situation is obviously required, and negotiations with leading firms to correct this situation have already begun.

It is no secret that relations between Bedouin and adjacent Jewish towns often border on the overtly hostile. Fortunately, some towns have begun to develop formal cooperation at the official level, in areas such as sewage treatment and garbage disposal. We believe there is an urgent need to go much farther and quickly, to provide the basis for genuine collaboration in numerous areas of particular importance to the Bedouin communities. At the outset, we would emphasize areas of economic and municipal cooperation, as these are most urgent and have the most immediate payback.

To advance this process, we propose that each Mayor in the Bedouin towns appoint a Jewish liaison person. They should work with their Jewish counterparts to encourage them to appoint a Bedouin liaison person. A regional umbrella group of these liaison persons would meet several times a year to review areas of success and failure, and to propose an ever-widening net of cooperative efforts. We propose to approach international NGOs who might be willing to join in sponsoring just such cooperative efforts.

Although this proposal may appear to be trivial, we believe that breaking down longstanding barriers is essential to promote the image of the Bedouins as legitimate and valuable citizens of the Negev. With this recognition, a major hurdle to advancing their rights, and achieving equality of treatment will begin to be overcome. Beyond that, the networks that form are invaluable in building the economic linkages that are so necessary for the development of the Bedouin towns.

Based on the above discussion, detailed proposals for launching the economic bases of these towns is presented in Appendix 1 b) and c).

e. The Unrecognized Settlements

All of the Bedouin towns have their rural periphery, consisting of most of the rapidly growing collection of unrecognized settlements, numbering some 45 by now. There is already in hand a major study by the Regional Council of Unrecognized Villages (RCUV) of these entities. Government proposals to create new urban settlements (5, 4, or 3) into which a segment of this population would be moved has encountered serious resistance, in no small measure due to their earlier planning failures. The alternative proposal by RCUV promotes the establishment of new, optimally sited rural villages that are essentially service centers. The goal is to enable the Bedouins to remain on the land they claim.

The proposal has implications for two important issues with which we are dealing. One is the relationship between these rural villages and the seven existing towns. The rural communities do not and cannot function in isolation from region-wide

networks. Indeed, in some towns, the majority of children in the school system are from surrounding rural areas (e.g. Segev Shalom). The second issue emerges from the assumption based on RCUV survey results that persons in the 45 unrecognized settlements would want to retain a predominantly rural lifestyle. This might change if our plans succeed so that alternatives to the undesirable state of the existing towns become available. In addition, most agricultural activity is not now economically viable, and will become less so as water shortages grow ever more serious. As a result, some of the next generation will be even less inclined to settle for what will be a very difficult time in agriculture. Hence, plans for the development of the seven existing towns must allow for substantial potential migration from rural areas, which will accelerate their growth rates, providing even greater development challenges for them.

The government's preferred alternative, to create entirely new Bedouin urban settlements, will likely have an important negative impact on the existing towns. Few if any of the existing Bedouin towns have achieved an efficient size. Since the Bedouin towns do not work at all well, some view them, and especially the larger ones as already too big. In that view, creating more small towns is an appealing alternative, since expanding the existing ones would make matters worse. However, the underlying problem for these towns is not their size, but their non-functionality. Making them economically viable and relieving their land constraints would enable them to grow significantly beyond their present and even their projected sizes, becoming more efficient urban centers in consequence. Hence, a program of introducing additional towns would detrimentally delay their achievement of a more viable size. And this would occur at great public expense, since building urban infrastructure afresh is much more costly than adding to an existing base. A more appropriate solution consistent with our developmental strategy is to strengthen the economy of existing towns while linking the rural settlements much more closely to them. That will add to the attractiveness of the existing towns, ensuring that a much higher level of services will be provided to the dispersed communities.

Notwithstanding, we fully endorse RCUV's fundamental principle that the Bedouins should be as free to choose where to live as are other Israelis. If some wish to live outside an urban framework with somewhat restricted access to services, that choice should be up to them. But if others desire an urban lifestyle, and all the amenities it offers, then we propose to offer the best possible framework for achieving their personal welfare. Our cursory examination suggests that the government-proposed new towns are likely to provide an inferior response to this challenge.

Conclusions

In this section, we have presented a strategic plan for developing the Bedouin urban sector that appears to offer a reasonable chance to make fundamental and effective changes to the no-win situation in which it now exists. We have provided a conceptual rationale and a variety of derived projects that could be launched. We are not in a position to provide detailed blueprints. Moving on to that stage requires first and foremost an extensive consultation process with the broader Bedouin community to ensure that the concepts we are advancing are both sound and acceptable. It then requires the creation of an implementation system that is capable of managing what will be a most challenging process. Such a system would have, as *its* mandate, the studying of the feasibility of the various suggestions in our strategic plan. It is to these implementation issues that we turn in the Part III.

AN IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM

The concluding part of this report provides a program for implementing the urban development strategies that have been formulated. Central to the implementation process is consultation with the larger Bedouin community on the proposed strategy, and the design of mechanisms for managing such a strategy. The issue of urban management is emphasized because it is so vital to a development program. Lacking access to the machinery of government at higher levels, the Bedouin community is obliged to acquire much greater control over local affairs to achieve a minimal degree of empowerment. The management of urban affairs from the top, by non-Bedouins, has proven to be a failure in most respects.

The implementation process that is being proposed is an evolving one. It will lead to reinterpretations of our evidence and revisions of our conceptual approach. Furthermore, the institutional and manpower requirements for implementation will themselves evolve. In other words, the whole endeavor is a learning process, which must be approached with openness, flexibility, and a high level of professionalism.

Validation of the Strategic Plan

The strategic plan we have presented requires validation at several levels. First and foremost the conceptual approach must be consistent with the needs and the wishes of the Bedouin population, and in particular the Bedouin urban population in the seven towns. It is essential that any proposed solution have from the outset the endorsement of a large proportion of this community. Without such approval, there will be no ownership of the program, and the forces that have in the past militated against helping this community will once again be able to divide and rule. The fact is that the internal divisions within the Bedouin community have been a part of the problem. Resolving those differences must now become a major part of the solution. Long standing factionalism has prevented various clans/tribes from

seeing their common interest, and emphasis on past wrongs rather than future possibilities has prevented the adoption of creative solutions being advanced by its own young, educated leadership. If change is to occur, it must start with an attitudinal one on the part of the Bedouin community itself to unite around a policy framework that offers them the promise of progress and justice.

To achieve community endorsement and cooperation we are convening the Bedouin urban leadership, to whom the ideas will be presented, and from whom responses will be elicited. We also are planning less formal workshops to enable lay representatives from the communities to articulate their own conception of their local problems and to propose solutions, as well as to react to our proposals.

Once modified in line with community aspirations, an effort must be made to render the strategic plan consistent with the current plans of and for the Negev as a whole. Meetings with the key planners (such as for Tama 35, Metropolitan Beer Sheva, The RCUV Report, etc.) are to be convened as well as with the senior officials working in the Negev (Israel Lands Administration, Bedouin Administration, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Infrastructure, Ministry of Housing, Ministry of the Interior, etc.). What is being sought is their response to the strategic framework of the plan at this stage, rather than any commitment to individual projects. In particular, they will be urged to consider how their plans might be amended or adjusted to accommodate this policy departure.

Finally, our approach will be discussed with those responsible for the overall planning and budgeting mechanisms of the government. These include the central planners in Jerusalem, many in the same agencies as above, but in addition the critical Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister's office. As a result of these discussions, those who are chosen to implement the program will be in a position to reformulate it and translate it into an action plan. Some guidelines for that stage are outlined below.

From Strategic Planning to Formulating an Action Plan

Whereas a strategic plan provides general ideas based on analysis and assessments, an action plan (or business plan) translates these ideas into specific steps to be taken. The action plan provides full-blown project design, including mechanisms for finance, management, etc. Interdependencies between project elements are identified, general time lines and sequences developed, orders of magnitude specified, and so forth. If our strategic plan attempts to answer the question "*what*

is to be done?” the action plan begins to tackle the question of “*how* is it to be done?”

We propose identifying a very small representative sample of Bedouins (about 30) to serve as a focus group for testing the action plans when they have been prepared, and obtaining feedback. A series of meetings will be held with them in smaller groups representing the individual towns, to look at local proposals. As well, meetings will be held with all of them to review the system-wide proposals. One additional objective is to try and identify potential community leaders and activists who will be able to participate in plan implementation or who might be suitable for special management training programs.

Elements of an Implementation Program

In addition to the *what* and *how* questions, there is the *by whom* question. We must construct appropriate management structures to assist with what is a *serious lack of managerial resources*. And we must find ways to overcome the *limited volume of financial resources* that are likely to be made available. Without the strategic use of these scarce resources, the whole initiative will not be feasible.

a. The Strategic Use of Scarce Financial Resources

Given the likely continuation of fiscal restraints on governmental programs, we are not expecting or demanding massive public transfers. However justified by past inequities, we recognize that such an approach is simply not a starter in today’s fiscal and ideological environment. That is why we have opted for a developmental approach that is strategic, that as much as possible uses existing tools and incentives in ways that yield multiplied benefits, and benefits which continue to flow long into the future, rather than mere one-shot compensatory transfers. Wherever possible, say as in the case of Nevatim Airport, we have advocated trying to piggyback Bedouin initiatives on programs that have already been endorsed. The incremental cost will be modest and the impact of these large-scale projects on the Bedouin towns can be substantial if properly leveraged.

Nevertheless, a number of the initiatives we are proposing will require some public funding. We advocate as the guiding principle that the rules that are applied elsewhere in Israel be applied fairly to the Bedouin sector. We emphasize fairness, because our research has demonstrated that there is systematic and unjustifiable under funding of Bedouin cities in virtually all fields, usually hidden behind a

smokescreen of disingenuous rationalizations. We believe that with clear and fair rules, applied uniformly and openly, many Bedouins will come forward who will be willing and able to exercise their talents as entrepreneurs and join the ranks of the successful business class upon which all towns are dependent for development. One of the tasks of the proposed BUDA (see below) will be to monitor these financial programs much more diligently than has hitherto been the case.

There are foundations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Israel and abroad from which at least partial support for promising programs can be obtained. Foreign governments have already participated in important Bedouin initiatives. Preparing proposals to obtain funding from these sources ought to be another major task of the BUDA.

b. The Strategic Use of Scarce Manpower Resources

An even greater challenge is to launch such a complex initiative in the absence of sufficient highly qualified managers. Several facts have become apparent in the course of this study. The first is that planning and management from above, that is, from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, are not, and cannot be, efficient or appropriate to the needs of Bedouin cities. The second is that given the scarcity of managerial personnel at the local, Bedouin town level, modest but effective mechanisms will have to be created that are capable of inducing appropriate actions while maintaining sensitivity to local needs. The above principles lead to a number of specific recommendations with regard to creating an appropriate management system for implementation.

Our bottom-up urban development policy must be based first and foremost on *community input and participation*. Even the administration of national programs within the Bedouin towns has not had more than token Bedouin representation. That paternalism has done much to create an insecure and dependent urban population, one that lacks incentive to exercise entrepreneurial and innovational skills.

All national programs for the Bedouins should be *formally approved, in law and in budgetary terms*, by the government, with a commitment to ensure that the relevant agencies play their part. Up to now, too much has been left to bureaucratic discretion, and that has been harmful in the extreme. We are not advocating the irresponsible transfer of unlimited funds. It is obvious that all public programs should be subject to rigorous analysis at the outset, careful monitoring throughout and critical evaluation at the end. However, primary responsibility for implementation should be borne by the community that is obliged to face the consequences of that policy. The evidence is overwhelming that even with support

from the top political echelons, or where compelled by law, there is a culture inbred in Israel's bureaucracy that militates against fair, equitable treatment of most Bedouin issues, and most particularly those related to land and urban services. Only a major overhaul of the delivery system will once and for all remove this unconscionable barrier to reform and progress. It is also true that examples of authentic top level political support are few and far between, but even the few cases that can be identified failed to take into account administrative resistance. By not taking steps to ensure that what they promise is in fact carried out, leaders have lost much of their credibility with the Bedouin community. The latter has become increasingly capable of litigation, and if necessary, will force changes by appeal to the higher courts or the State Comptroller.^{xi} Early in March 2000, the courts rejected the exclusion of Arabs from purchasing public lands in Katzir – a decision that will turn out to be momentous. Such has been the experience of indigenous persons in countries from Canada to Australia.

To the extent that there are concerns about potential financial and other abuses of delegated authority, we would respectfully point out that most Jewish local authorities (not to mention national political parties and their leaders) have demonstrated that Bedouins need concede nothing on this score. In any event, the application of appropriate oversight methods to local spending and revenue raising should by now be a matter of course for all localities. The present situation, in which transfers periodically wipe out deficits of profligate Jewish urban areas, while Bedouin towns are held to higher standards of fiscal responsibility, is hypocritical in the extreme.

We recommend that all government agencies dealing with the Bedouins recruit immediately an appropriate number of qualified and independent Bedouin officials. Even the present Bedouin Administration has only a token number of Bedouin employees. Perpetuation of the arrangement, whereby others are dictating policies to the Bedouins without their systematic input and participation in the implementation of those policies is both unacceptable and doomed to failure. There is a growing cohort of trained Bedouins who can fill these roles at least as ably as do current non-Bedouin officials. We intend to appoint the best and brightest to play leading roles in designing and implementing this program, even where they are (usually justifiably) overtly critical of policy failures.

To improve matters, we propose to create a *Center for Bedouin Urban Administration (CBUA)* that can, within 12 to 24 months, turn out a cadre of say 20 well-trained MBA/MPAs capable of doing the job. We have already held preparatory discussions with a foreign university experienced in delivering such programs.^{xii}

A Key Institution:

The Bedouin Urban Development Agency (BUDA)

Given the scarcity of management resources, establishing an effective institution to direct our ambitious development program is our top priority. We require a mechanism that can transcend the factional rifts in the community, and can take a longer view of the process. International experience indicates that urban development agencies have been very effective, especially under the right circumstances.^{xiii} The latter include freedom from day to day political pressure, highly professional staff, a clear mandate, and multi-year budgetary commitments with stability (that is, budgets that are not subject to departmental manipulation once set).

The question of the scope of this sort of agency is critical. Should we create one agency for all the towns, or should each town have its own? In matters pertaining to development, local governments play a crucial role. But first and foremost they are elected to represent local interests. As a result a mechanism is required for operating at a higher level, to resolve conflicts between local interests. We propose to create a Bedouin Mayors' Council whose job will be to help develop action plans and assign overall priorities. But once adopted, the actual implementation should be insulated as much as possible from local manipulation. We know of no other way that will ensure the strategy gets implemented quickly and effectively.

We therefore propose to create a small but highly effective *Bedouin Urban Development Agency (BUDA)* to manage the urban development program. The current Bedouin Authority would be dissolved. It would be useful if the BUDA were recognized by an act of the Knesset. The agency will ensure the equitable and effective development of Bedouin towns through bringing urban infrastructure and services, and in particular, education, health and social services in the Bedouin community up to national standards within a fixed time frame. Regarding development, it will be empowered to ensure that the action plans are completed promptly and that implementation begins where indicated immediately thereafter. Its programs and hence budget will be multi-year, in line with the profiles of individual projects, and once approved and funded, it must be insulated from official manipulation from outside. It will be accountable to the Mayor's Council and to other funding agencies for relevant projects. Its management will come primarily from the Bedouin community and may include government officials from participating departments. The CEO will be a proven, competent Bedouin policy analyst acceptable to the Bedouin community, and the majority of the executive committee will be Bedouins.

The main benefit of a development agency of this sort is that the typical turf battles among government agencies, among Bedouin interests, and between these groups will be mitigated. Those battles will be fought at the outset, in designing the action plans. But once approved, and with the support of its sponsors, the BUDA will be able to get on with its work, freeing it from fighting continual rearguard actions.

Taking Charge

Implementing all the recommendations of this study will depend in no small measure on the support of government. We are under no illusions as to how difficult obtaining it will be. We do not propose to wait for that process to produce either formal approval or a windfall of money from it. Since many of our proposals do not require either government money or approval, they can be launched quickly. Indeed, we have already begun to mobilize resources within the community and from outside.

Creating a *Bedouin Mayors' Council* is the first formal step. It is more credible now that all the mayors are elected. It can present a united front to the government, and move quickly to plan and recruit for the BUDA. And BUDA has a full agenda of activities it can begin to work on, from providing the details of the action plan, to setting up the *Bedouin Transport Company (BTC)* to securing financial and political support for its activities.

Acting autonomously poses a major challenge to the urban Bedouin community, for it entails a fundamental shift towards taking major responsibility for its own destiny. If it is fearful of losing government support by so doing, or unable to overcome longstanding communal rivalries, or unwilling to permit its best young minds to play a central role in shaping its future, or unwilling to take measures necessary to restore respect for the law within its cities, then it is not ready for any serious development effort. The ambitious program we have outlined to provide a better future will assuredly not work. More positively, we can think of no step more effective in communicating to the Israeli majority that the time has come for the political and economic emancipation of the Bedouins.

Monitoring Progress: Setting Plan Targets and Milestones

One of the great weaknesses of traditional planning initiatives is the absence of specific, measurable indicators of performance, by which to shape, monitor and evaluate the plans. An idea is promoted, plans are made, resources are mobilized, and the plan is implemented. But in the absence of relevant yardsticks, how is one

to judge the progress of the initiative, and hold those responsible accountable? And without such knowledge, how is one to know if or when the initiative may be going seriously off course so that corrective action can be taken to avoid wasting additional scarce resources? Such was clearly the problem with the foundation plans for the seven Bedouin towns.

Depending on the degree of acceptance of the final action plans, we would recommend that a list of between 5 and 10 appropriate indicators be identified, that measurable yardsticks for them be set up, and that every five years during the life of the plan, performance be matched against these indicators and be made known to all involved. Table 3 presents a hypothetical example of such a framework.

Table 3: Hypothetical Performance Indicators for Project Evaluation

Indicator	Measured by	Year 0	Year 5	Year 10	Year 15	Year 20	Year 25
Unemployment	Times greater than national average	2	1.75	1.5	1.35	1.2	1
Family Income	Percentage of national average	40	50	60	70	80	90
Infant Mortality	Times greater than national average	1.56	1.50	1.44	1.32	1.22	1.10
Industry	Number of factories employing 5+	8	10	14	20	30	50
Car Ownership	Percentage of national average	25	30	35	40	45	50
University Eligibility	Bagrut % relative to national average	23	30	40	55	70	85
BGU Graduates	Number of graduates	18	50	150	300	500	800
Employment	Number of Bedouins in govt offices*	15	50	150	300	600	1000

Source of Benchmark Data (Year 0): *SYNB*, No. 1, 1999, for Rahat only.

Note: * Excludes Education, Culture and Religious Affairs

A true set of indicators must be derived from the action plans that are adopted. The process of negotiating these yardsticks will provide a clear sense of the degree of commitment to the enterprise, and clarity over its ultimate goals.

Additional Immediate Implementation Requirements

Most important is the immediate identification of a *leadership cadre* who can take responsibility for moving the effort ahead. Such leadership must be from the Bedouin community, and be acceptable to it. It must be able to command the

attention of the government, and mediate among the different interests of the Bedouin community, including, but not restricted to, the urban community thereof.

Very important is the *mobilizing of high-level political support* for the initiative. In the first instance, this means presenting the approved version of this report to appropriate officials. Only the formal and unwavering support of the highest levels, that is, the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister, and through them, Cabinet will enable the more costly aspects of the plan to be implemented. A committee of friendly parliamentarians could prove to be crucial in this regard. Eliciting top level support requires not just eloquently delivered supportive sentiments, but the preparing and passing of appropriate legislation, and means to ensure that the principle of fairness and accountability be adhered to in all national programs.

In parallel with official support, extraordinary efforts will be made to *sell the program* to the larger, mainly Jewish public. This public is largely uninformed about the nature of the problem, and often bears ill will towards the Bedouin community. Sympathetic leadership as well as journalists and those in the legal profession must be made stakeholders in this initiative. Community activists in neighboring Jewish towns and in Beer Sheva will also be brought into the process to help pave the way for legislative support in the future. We therefore propose that one of the first assignments of BUDA working with the Bedouin Center at BGU be to recruit experts in the media to develop a coherent, long term communications strategy to deliver the message of this report.

We believe there is an important role to be played by Jewish philanthropists and investors abroad as well. Many have been turned off by non-accountable fundraisers, and have begun to emphasize specific project support. For those concerned with the future of the Negev, providing financial and professional assistance to implement a program such as this should prove uniquely challenging. Their ability to influence government action to get behind the program should not be underestimated.

To clarify and guide the implementation process, we present, in Figure 4, a detailed implementation program.

Figure 4: Implementation Strategy

ACTIVITY	OBJECTIVE	TIME LINES					
		Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar
							+
A. Refining the Report							
Presenting First Draft to the	To obtain criticism and	x					

Bedouin Community	endorsement						
Meetings with local leaders		X					
Meetings with local officials		X					
Meetings with community, participatory appraisal			X				
Redrafting for Government Presentation	To reflect Bedouin interests		X				
Presenting Revised Draft to Government	To obtain criticism and support				X		
Meetings with top level officials					X		
Meetings departmental officials					X		
Meeting with ministers					X		
Meeting with senior government leaders						X	
Preparing Final Draft	For wide dissemination					X	

B. Communicating the Results							
Official Presentations (press involved)	Formal Approval					X	
To Bedouins						X	
To Government						X	
To neighboring communities						X	
Meetings with friendly MKs	Internal lobbying					X	
Media strategy	Public lobbying					X	
Selected articles, all press						X	
Press conferences						X	
TV appearances, Bedouin leaders, Bed. Center, MKs						X	
Create web site	Information and lobbying						X
Overseas symposia	International lobbying, financing						X
Jewish leadership							X
Foreign governments, agencies							X
NGOs							X
Foundations							X

C. Release of Monographs							
Local symposia	Rallying local elite support		X	X			
International conference	Raising international profile of issue						X
Press coverage for both							

D. Initiating Local Action							
Create Bedouin Mayors' Council	Initiate key management systems		x				
Create Nascent Bedouin Urban Development Agency	Take over implementation process			x			
Recruit leadership							
Recruit preliminary staff, offices, etc.							
BUDA assumes responsibility for implementation	All aspects				x		
Create BTC						x	
Implement other components of program (Appendix 1)						x	x
Assume responsibility for government liaison						x	
Launch Center for Bedouin Urban Administration						x	
Prepare Action Plan						x	
Refine Implementation Plan						x	
Extend generalized lobbying effort							x
Deepen liaisons abroad							x

E. Securing Legislation and Budgets							
Prepare draft legislation	Secure legislation						x
Presentation of legislation							x
Lobbying initiatives							x
Focused lobbying with key Ministers, PM, etc.							x
Focused lobbying with MKs							x
Budget planning	Secure budget						x
Prepare multi-period budget							x
Focused lobbying with Finance Ministry							x
Communications efforts, press, etc.	External pressures on government						x

CONCLUSION

Based on experience elsewhere and the logic of urban development, we have offered a strategic plan for the Bedouin towns that should, when fleshed out, be able to meet many of their present and future needs. But we cannot be certain. It is for the Bedouin community itself to determine if the approach being proposed is the way they want to go. In other words, even though it may “work” in theory, it has to work for them, and no one should presume to decide that issue from the outside. At the very least, we trust the ideas developed herein will finally force everyone to take the problems of the towns seriously, and to think rigorously about finding better solutions.

We end with a rather blunt lecture to the government. It is apparent that the government in particular bears a heavy responsibility for its failed urban initiatives in the Bedouin sector. Any attempt to correct the situation must therefore begin with an acceptance of that responsibility, one that is stated in national and international conventions and declarations to which Israel is a party.

Honoring National Principles

In its *Declaration of Independence*, Israel’s founders stated that:

The State of Israel will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. (*Declaration of the Establishment of Israel*, May 14, 1948)

This commitment alone, if fulfilled, should provide a strong enough basis for reversing the government’s current policy orientation towards the Bedouins and taking a new direction based on redressing past inequities and restructuring its development plans to include the needs and interests of its Bedouin citizens.

Honoring International Commitments

In addition, as a member state of the United Nations (UN) Israel has ratified numerous human rights declarations and covenants drafted by the UN. These include *the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, and the *Declaration on the Right to Development*. By doing so, Israel has committed itself to protecting and promoting the human, social and economic rights of all of its citizens, and to supporting their development.

According to the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, States Parties...undertake to guarantee that...rights...will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status...States Parties...undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights...The States Parties...recognize the right of everyone to...fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind...Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted...Education shall be made equally accessible to all. (*Articles 2,3,7 and 13*)

Furthermore, the *Declaration on the Right to Development* states that:

The right to development is an inalienable human right...every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to...enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights...can be fully realized...The human person is the central subject of development and should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to development...States should undertake...all necessary measures for the realization of the right to development and shall ensure...equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income... (*Articles 1, 2 and 8*)

We take the Israeli government's commitment to these principles seriously, even if they have not been adhered to in the case of the Bedouins. We have developed a plan for economic development and growth for the seven Bedouin towns that, with modest public support, will help the most disadvantaged persons in the country attain these rights. We do not require the government's permission to begin implementing the plan, but we would sincerely welcome its full and enthusiastic partnership in seeing it through. The above declarations provide a solid basis upon which that partnership can and should be built.

Appendix 1: Town Specific Development Strategies

a. Rahat and Tel Sheva

STRATEGIC PROJECTS	Priority	Assignment	Cost Category	Time Considerations (Years)	
				To Start	To Completion +

RAHAT: Administrative Pole

Administrative Functions					
Bedouin Community College (started)	A	Gov	Modest	0	2
Regional Hospital	A	Gov	High	2	3
Bedouin Development Bank	B	Gov/Intl	Modest	1	2
BUDA Head Office	A	Gov	Low	0	1
National Government Offices	A	Gov	Low	0	2
Regional Administrative Offices	B	Gov/Region	Low	0	2
Business Components					
Highway Commercial with Lehavim	A	Gov/Loc/Priv	Modest	1	2
Business Service Center	B	Gov/Loc/Priv	Modest	2	2
Job Registry	A	Gov/Loc	Low	0	1
Transport Components					
Realignment of Trans-Israel Highway	B	Gov	High	2	8
Railway Station (with Lehavim)	A	Gov	Low	1	1
Access Road to Route # 40	A	Gov/Loc	Modest	1	1

TEL SHEVA: Economic Pole

Economic Functions					
Business Park Nevatim Rd.	A	Gov/Loc	High	1	2
Business Park Rte 6/Railway					
Job Registry	A	Gov/Loc	Low	in progress	
Training Center	B	Gov	Modest	1	1
Business Incubator	B	Gov/Priv	Modest	2	1
Mentoring Program – Omer Ind Park	A	Priv	Low	0	1
Nevatim Construction	A	Gov	Low	3	2
Nevatim Operations Linkage	B	Gov	Modest	5	2
Omer Industrial Park	A	Priv	Low	0	1
Free Processing Zone (if proceeds)	C	Priv	Low	?	?
Transport Components					
Tie-in to Road to Nevatim	B	Gov	Low	3	1
Tie-in to Trans-Israel Highway	C	Gov	Low	3	4
Tie-in to Beer Sheva Circumferential	A	Gov	Low	0	1
Station - HSCN, intercity	B	Gov	Low	1	1
Agricultural Opportunities					
Research Teaching/MOP	A	Gov/Uni	Low	1	1
Packaging, Processing (Nevatim)	C	Gov/Priv	High	5	5
Hi Tech Agriculture	A	Gov/Uni	Modest	2	2
Designer Crops	B	Gov/Uni	Modest	2	2

Appendix 1: Town Specific Development Strategies

b. Kseifa, Arara and Laqiya

KSEIFA: Communications and Hospitality

Communications					
Communication products (wireless)	A	Arad, Motorola	Low	0	2
Call center	B	Gov/Priv	Modest	1	2
Hospitality					
Training Center for Bedouins	A	Arad/Dead Sea hotels, rest, etc.	Moderate	1	2
Mentoring -Arad	A	Priv	Moderate	0	1
Job Registry	A	Gov/Loc	Low	0	1
Airport Spinoffs					
Agriculture Processing, Shipping	C	Gov/Priv	High	5	5
Nevatim Construction	A	Gov	Low	3	2
Nevatim Operations Linkage	B	Gov	Modest	5	2
Transport Components					
HSCN Station	B	Gov	High	2	2

ARARA: Energy and Electronics Manufacturing

Energy					
New Bedouin Applications	A	Dimona	Modest	2	3
Solar Energy Research and Exper.	B	Sde Boqer/Gov	Modest	1	3
Solar Desalination, Research and Exp	B	Dead Sea/Gov	High	1	5
Electronic Components					
Manufacturing	A	Dell-Vishay	Low	0	1
Mentoring - Dimona, Temed	A	Priv	Moderate	0	1
Job Registry	A	Gov/Loc	Low	0	ongoing
Airport Spinoffs					
Agriculture Processing, Shipping	C	Gov/Priv	High	5	5
Nevatim Construction	A	Gov	Low	3	2
Nevatim Operations Linkage	B	Gov	Modest	5	2
Transport Components					
HSCN Station	A	Gov	Low	1	1
Free Processing Zone (if proceeds)	C	Priv	Low	?	?

LAQIYA: Education and Commerce

Education					
University Prep. (Mechina) program	B	Region/Uni	Modest	1	1
Women's School, all Bedouins	A	Gov	Modest	1	2
Technical College, all Bedouins	C	Gov	High	2	3
Teacher's College, all Bedouins	A	Gov	High	0	2
Business Links					
Shoqet Center (Metar, Hura)	A	Gov	Modest	2	2
Local Shopping Center	B	Gov/Loc/Priv	Modest	1	1
Network Training Program	A	Priv.	Low	1	1
Job Registry	A	Gov/Local	Low	0	1
Transport Components					
Direct Road Link to Omer Ind. Park	A	Gov	Modest	1	1
Shoqet HSCN Station	B	Gov	High	2	2

Appendix 1: Town Specific Development Strategies

c. Segev Shalom and Hura

SEGEV SHALOM: Environment and Agriculture

Environment					
Recycling Industries	A	R.Hovav/Gov	High	0	3
Waste Treatment	A	R.Hovav/Gov	High	1	2
Mentoring -Ramat Hovav, Beer Sheva	A	Priv	Moderate	0	1
Job Registry	A	Gov/Local	Low	0	1
Agriculture					
R &D (MOP) Advanced Methods	A	Uni/Gov	Low	0	1
High School Program (Region)	A	Gov/Local	Low	0	2
Agric College (Bedouin)	C	Gov	High	2	3
Agriculture Industry Incubator	B	Gov	Modest	1	2
Packing, Processing	B	Gov/Priv	High	2	4
Transport Components					
Additional Access Road	A	Gov	Modest	2	2
HSCN Station	A	Gov	Low	1	1

HURA: Transport and Agriculture

Transport Services					
BTC	A	Gov/Loc/Priv	Modest	0	1
Vehicle Repair and Maintenance	B	Priv	Modest	2	1
Agriculture					
Advanced Methods	A	Region	Modest	1	2
Agricultural College branch	C	Gov	Modest	3	3
Agriculture MOP, branch	C	Gov	Modest	2	1
Agriculture Industry Incubator	B	Gov	Modest	1	2
Professional Gardening	A	Loc/Priv	Low	0	1
Agricultural Equipment (M and R)	B	Priv	Low	1	2
Business Links					
Shoqet Center (Metar, Hura)	A	Gov	Modest	2	2
Network Training Program	A	Priv.	Low	1	1
Job Registry	A	Gov/Local	Low	0	1
Construction					
Housebuilding, Repairs	B	Priv/Kibbutz	Modest	1	1
Housebuilding Incubator	A	Gov	Modest	1	1
Transport Components					
Shoqet HSCN Station	B	Gov	High	2	2

Appendix 2: Employment of Bedouins in Negev Industries, 1998

Major Firms and Cities	Industry Sector	Main Product(s)	Workers #	Bedouins #
I. SUB-REGION AROUND TEL SHEVA AND SEGEV SHALOM				
BEER SHEVA				
Feuchtwanger Asher Ltd.	Electrical and Electronic	Controls	100	
Kirur Benny	Electrical and Electronic	Refrigerators	98	
Isr Aircraft Ltd - Ramta Division	Electrical and Electronic	Engines	480	
Harsa	Electrical and Electronic	Sanitary equipment	180	2
Fiber Technik	Rubber and Plastic	Chemical fiberglass equip	60	
A.A. Plast	Rubber and Plastic	Containers	60	5
Bel Art Israel Ltd.	Rubber and Plastic	Containers for chemicals	70	9
Triumph International	Textiles and Clothing	Undergarments	100	
Nimrod	Textiles and Clothing	Shoes and sandals	80	4
Mishkan Hachelet	Textiles and Clothing	Prayer shawls	40	2
Arihant Textiles	Textiles and Clothing	T-shirts	100	
Solog Kntting	Textiles and Clothing	Childrens clothings	140	
Dunhill S. General Industries	Chemical Products	Building material, marble	140	4
Hasin - Esh Ceramic Products	Chemical Products	Ceramics	51	6
Thermal Isolation Center	Chemical Products	Thermal insulation material	43	3
Makhtesim Chemical Works Ltd.	Chemical Products	Crop protection material	901	
Klir Markting And Manufacturing Ltd.	Chemical Products	Chemicals	85	4
Zer Ma'adanim	Food and Beverage	Catering services	300	
Papa Michel Catering	Food and Beverage	Catering services	120	2
Harishonim Bakeries	Food and Beverage	Baked goods	50	17
Isa Khoury Metal Ind.	Metals	Metal products	120	10
Zinor Darom (82) Industries Ltd.	Metals	Metal piping	80	10
Nisir Metal Ind.	Metals	Metal products	50	20
Ozgam Ltd.	Metals	Faucets	70	
M.T.D. Industries	Metals	Metal products	100	3
Razpal	Metals	Aluminum material	89	3
Mitrani	Metals	Bathtubs	47	
Gold & Honey	Accessories	Gold jewellery	114	
Oknin Brothers	Accessories	Stands	200	
Total Beer Sheva			4891	160

OMER				
Bren Advanced Technologies Ltd.	Electrical and Electronic	Vehicle safety systems	40	
Katzenstein & Adler and Partners Ltd.	Electrical and Electronic	Electronic and control boards	25	
Rosh Tov Software Industries	Electrical and Electronic	Medical management software	80	
Atlas	Electrical and Electronic	Mapping software	71	
Motorola Semiconductor Israel	Electrical and Electronic	Development	70	
Inno - Wave	Electrical and Electronic	Marketing development	50	
Rav - Tek	Electrical and Electronic		90	
Total Omer			501	0
RAMAT HOVAV				
Chemagis	Chemical Products	Antibiotics	66	
Metek Metal Technology Ltd.	Chemical Products	Tungsten powder	70	
Luxembourg Chemicals	Chemical Products	Insecticide material	60	
Bromine Compounds Ltd.	Chemical Products	Bromine mixtures	948	
Negev Peroxide	Chemical Products	Peroxide	30	
Tetrabrom Technologies	Chemical Products	Tetrabromide	40	6
Tevatech	Electrical and Electronics	Medical products	30	3
Total Ramat Hovav			1270	10
TOTAL SUBREGION			6662	170
II. SUB-REGION AROUND RAHAT, LAQIYA AND HURA				
Dolev Plastic Products - Kib Dvir	Plastic containers	Rubber and Plastic	45	3
Shoqet Meat Delicacies - Kib Lahav	Meat	Food and Beverage	23	
Dvir Software Products - Kib Dvir	Software	Electronics and Electrical	25	1
Shoval Metal - Kib Shoval	Metal works	Rubber and Plastic	30	
Polybid - Kib Mishmar Hanegev	Adhesives and Plastics	Construction, Packaging	125	15
Negev Weaving Project-Laqiya	Clothing and Textiles	Woven Products	20	20
TOTAL SUBREGION			268	39

III. SUB-REGION AROUND ARARA				
DIMONA				
Israel Cutlery Industries Ltd.	Metals	Cutlery	50	
Sdom Metal	Metals	Constructs	100	5
Vishay Dell Israel	Electrical and Electronics	Electronic material	1623	
Seryo Knits	Textiles and Clothing	Sweaters	35	
Daniel Dimona Ltd.	Textiles and Clothing	Textile	65	
Kitan Consolidated	Textiles and Clothing	Linnen	460	13
Total Dimona			2381	26
ROTEM INDUSTRIAL ZONE				
Rotem Amfert Negev	Chemical Products	Phosphate	1503	
Haifa Chemicals- South Ltd.	Chemical Products	Potassium Nitrate	114	
Dead Sea Periclase	Chemical Products	Magnesium Oxide	235	2
D.S.W. - Dead Sea Works	Chemical Products	Potassium	2000	
PAMA	Chemical Products	Lipids	77	1
Total Rotem			3944	4
TEMED INDUSTRIAL ZONE				
Epsilon	Electrical and Electronics	Batteries and Electrical Equipment	60	
Dispomedic	Electrical and Electronics	Needles	35	
Negev Software Industries	Electrical and Electronics	Programs	95	
Total Temed			252	0
TOTAL SUBREGION			6577	30

IV. SUB-REGION AROUND KSEIFA				
ARAD				
Luxembourg Chemicals	Chemical Products	Herbicides	100	25
Thelma-Shefa Protein Industries	Food and Beverages	Food Products	200	4
Avidor	Textiles and Clothing		34	9
Arad Towels	Textiles and Clothing	Towels	290	29
Packer Plada - South	Metal Products		77	26
AMS Electronics	Electrical and Electronics	Medical and Computer Equipment	160	
Lintronics	Electrical and Electronics	Medical and Computer Equipment	10	
Motorola South	Electrical and Electronics	Communications Equipment	420	
Lemada Light Industries	Miscellaneous		70	
TOTAL SUBREGION			1387	96
TOTAL BEDOUIN URBAN REGION			14894	335

Source: Y. Gradus and R. Blustein-Livnon, *Industry in the Negev, 1998*, NCRD, 1998.

Endnotes

ⁱ Among useful documents, see A. Meir, *As Nomadism Ends: The Israeli Bedouin of the Negev*, Westview, Boulder, Colo. 1997; E. Marx, *The Bedouin Society in the Negev*, Reshavim, Tel Aviv, 1974 (Hebrew); I. Abu-Saad, "The Education of Israel's Negev Bedouin: Background and Prospects", *Israel Studies*, Vol. 2 (2):21-39, 1997; I. Abu-Saad, I. "Provision of public educational services and access to higher education among the Negev Bedouin Arabs in Israel," *Journal of Education Policy*, Vol. 11 (5):527-541, 1996; G. Falah, "Israel State Policy towards Bedouin Sedentarization in the Negev," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 18, 71-90, 1989; P. Maddrell, *The Bedouin of the Negev*. Minority Rights Group Report No. 81, London, 1990.

ⁱⁱ O. Yiftachel, "Israel's territorial policies and the Bedouin-Arabs: the predicament of the indigenous in a settling ethnocracy", paper presented to the First International Conference on the Future of Indigenous Peoples: Strategies for Survival and Development, Ben-Gurion University, Beer Sheva, Israel, May, 2000.

ⁱⁱⁱ E. Razin, *The Financial Capacity of the Bedouin Local Authorities in the Negev*, a monograph prepared for this project, May, 2000. An earlier paper by Prof. Razin, *Fiscal Disparities between Arab and Jewish Local Authorities: Is the Gap Narrowing?* Policy Paper for The Florsheimer Institute for Policy Studies, Jerusalem, 1999, raises related issues.

^{iv} *State Comptroller's Report*, 1999, pp. 498-522.

^v Y. Katz et. al., *Report of the Investigating Committee on the Bedouin Education System in the Negev*, March 1998.

^{vi} T. Fenster, *Bedouins in Israel*, Association for Advancement of Equal Opportunities, January, 1994; and H. Shapira, and J. Helerman, *The Bedouin of the Negev: Social Survey*, Unpublished survey conducted by Beit Korkus, Herzilya, Israel (Hebrew), 1998.

^{vii} *Statistical Yearbook of the Negev, 2000*, Negev Center for Regional Development, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 2000, Table VII.4. (Hereafter referred to as *SYN*).

^{viii} T. Fenster, *Development Plan for Bedouin Settlement in the Negev*, for the Ministry of Housing, December 1995.

^{ix} Sept. 17, 2000.

^x After some preliminary discussions, Dell-Vishay has agreed to recruit suitably trained Bedouin employees.

^{xi} Adala and HRA, *Equal Rights and Minority Rights for the Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel*, for the UN Human Rights Committee, July, 1998.

^{xii} Preliminary discussions with senior staff at the School of Public Administration at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada indicate enthusiastic support for such a program, which could be up and running quickly.

^{xiii} N. Hansen, B. Higgins and D. Savoie, *Regional Policy in a Changing World*, Plenum Press, NY, 1990.