Postmodern Cities and Spaces

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INTRODUCTION

Urban and regional planning as an organized field of human endeavour came into being as an integral part of what is often termed 'the modernist project' (Dear 1986; Hall 1988). Consequently, it has been conceived, by planners and public alike, as a rational, professional activity, aimed at producing a 'public good' of one kind or another. Research into the theory and practice of urban and regional planning has therefore tended to concentrate on its capacity to contribute to the attainment of well-established societal (modernist) goals, such as residential amenity, economic efficiency, social equity, or environmental sustainability. Far less attention has been devoted to the ability of planning to promote goals of an opposite nature, such as social repression, economic retardation or environmental degradation. In particular, the links between planning policy, the problems of ethnic minorities and the political impact of modernist concepts in developing societies are yet to be explored fully.

In this chapter, I will attempt to focus on these under-researched issues, by (1) exploring some theoretical aspects of the link between modernist planning concepts and the control of ethnic minorities in developing deeply divided societies; and (2) examining in detail the practice of 'planning as control' in Majd el Krum – an urbanizing Arab village in Israel's Galilee region – where the government has continuously attempted to contain, segregate and dominate the process of Arab development. The chapter therefore provides a critique of widely established concepts and practices of modern urban and regional planning.1

1 'Planning' is defined here as the formulation, content and implementation of spatial policies. 'Reform' implies 'making things better', affecting amendment or improvement in the affairs of subject groups. 'Control' means the regulations of development enforced from above, with the aim of maintaining existing patterns of social, political and economic domination. 'Ethnicity' is defined as a set of group characteristics, based on belief in a common history and place and usually including language, culture, race and/or religion. The term 'Israel' refers to the country within its pre-1967 borders. 'Palestine' is the pre-1948 geographical unit between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.

PLANNING AND THE CONTROL OF MINORITIES: SOME THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS

Planning: Reform or Control?

Urban and regional planning emerged out of the unacceptable and inhumane living conditions prevalent in the rapidly expanding industrial cities of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The emergence of planning was intimately linked to a broader reform movement, which sought to redress the ills of unconstrained capitalism, through changes to the politics, economy and geography of cities (Cherry 1988; Hall 1988; Schaffer 1988). While early planning thinkers (like later ones) were clearly divided along ideological lines, a discernible consensus underlay the development of planning thought and the emergence of the planning profession: planning should, first and foremost, act to improve people's (mainly physical) living conditions. This basic assumption formed the foundation for theories and tools which were later developed to guide public intervention in the development process and the land market. Most of the theories and concepts developed in planning during subsequent decades focused on two key questions: what is a good city? What is good planning? (see Cherry 1988; Hall 1988; Schaffer 1988; Yiftachel 1989).

Recent studies on the performance of planning systems clearly attest to the pervasive understanding of 'planning as reform'. Pearce (1992) and Healey (1992), for example, examine the historical performance of the British planning system by using as yardsticks the progressive concepts of amenity, order, efficiency, distributive justice and environmental protection. The recent evaluative works of Burgess (1993), Cherry (1988), Carmona (1990) and Schaffer (1988) also predominantly assess planning according to its ability to deliver improvement in the lives of subject populations. Even the thoroughly reflective work of Friedmann (1987) delineates four main perspectives which have dominated the development of planning theories and concepts: social reform, policy analysis, social learning and social mobilization. These are characterized, to varying degrees, by a view that planning has the capacity to reform and improve cities, regions and society. I argue here that this view of planning is narrow, too idealistic and often unrealistic. Furthermore, because planning has been widely interpreted as reform, relatively little research has focused on the instances when it acts as a regressive agent of change, particularly in the context of ethnic relations.

To be sure, the reformist–benevolent interpretation of planning is not universal. Contrasting accounts exist, particularly from Marxist, feminist and racial perspectives
Planning in Deeply Divided Societies

Urban and regional planning in the form known today in the West first emerged in the Anglo-Saxon world, particularly in Great Britain. Subsequently, the debate over the goals, achievements and effectiveness of planning has been mainly confined to the institutional and political settings usually defined as 'liberal democracy'. This setting is characterized by a capitalist economy, a subsequent dominance of the market in politics (Lindblom 1977), a promotion of individualism, and a two-party political system with little minority representation (Liphart 1984).

A fundamental difference exists between these liberal democracies and other, more collectively segmented societies. This difference can be highlighted by differentiating between two main types of multiethnic society: pluralistic and deeply divided (or plural). Pluralistic societies are typically composed of immigrant groups which tend to assimilate over time, and are usually governed by a liberal-democratic regime. In such societies, one's ethnic affiliation is a private matter, and ethnic movements mainly focus on the attainment of civil and economic equality. Ethnic affairs are often intertwined with class issues, which are the most dominant social cleavage in such societies.

On the other hand, deeply divided societies are composed of non-assimilating ethnic groups which occupy their historical (real or mythical) homeland. Hence, ethnic movements in such societies tend to promote goals of cultural and regional autonomy, recognition of national minority status for sizeable ethnic groups, and at times ethnic separatism. In deeply divided societies, ethnic conflicts are potentially more explosive, often threatening the very structure or unity of the state (Connor 1987). For that reason, government policies in such societies often attempt to control ethnic minorities, hoping to prevent serious challenges to the character or the territorial integrity of the state. Control policies typically attempt to retard the minority's economic development, contain its territorial expression, and exclude it from the state's centres of power and influence.

Notably, the Western countries where planning has flourished, as either an organized profession or a field of active research (Britain, Australia or New Zealand, the USA and Canada), are all pluralistic societies governed by liberal-democratic regimes. However, following British colonialism and the global spread of Western influence and capitalism, the ideas, concepts, methods and institutions of urban and regional planning have spread to many developing countries. Western planning ideas thus found their way to many deeply divided societies, where ethnic groups have often had a long history of struggles over land control, and where local political systems were far from the Western version of liberal democracy. The introduction of Anglo-Saxon planning ideas to these fundamentally different societies has created a set of problems and contradictions.

One of the most obvious problems has been the conversion of planning from a progressive tool of reform to an instrument of control and repression. This became possible because, in most post-colonial societies, one ethnic group came to dominate the state, using its apparatus (including planning) to maintain and strengthen this domination (Demaine 1984; Smooha 1990). While such ethnic domination may occur in Western pluralistic societies, it is usually more subtle, and is often constrained in such societies by the dominance of markets in politics (Lindblom 1977), and by legal mechanisms which protect civil rights. In many deeply divided societies - even those with formal democratic systems - these constraints to majority dominance are either weak or lacking all together (Esman 1985). In addition, the substance matter of planning - the use of land - is a vital issue in deeply divided societies, due to the historical attachment of ethnic groups to their homeland, which assumes extreme political importance, particularly in the current 'ethnic revival' age (A. Smith 1981).

As mentioned, the use of planning to control segments of the population has not been confined to deeply divided societies. It has undoubtedly occurred in Western (pluralistic) democratic societies, although this has usually transpired in relatively subtle ways, mainly through market mechanisms (see, for example: Harvey 1973; Huxley 1994; McLaughlin 1992) or male domination (Fincher 1990; Sandercock and Forsythe 1992; Little 1993). In such societies, the consequences of 'control through planning' have been usually manifested through class and gender relations, which are less tangible or visible than the primordial ethnicity characteristic of deeply divided societies. Even ethnic and racial discrimination has largely been expressed in Western-liberal societies through (usually distorted) market outcomes, rather than explicit ethnically-based legislation and policies (S. Smith 1989; Thomas 1988). In contrast, the structural importance of ethnicity in deeply divided societies has meant that the use of planning as control has in many cases become quite explicit and blatant.

The very same planning tools usually introduced to assist social reform and improvement in people's quality of life can be used as a means of controlling and repressing minority groups. This explicitly regressive face of planning has yet to be widely studied or theorized. Studies of the impact of public policy on ethnic and racial relations abound, although they mostly address ethnic issues in pluralistic (not deeply divided) societies, and few specifically address the influence of land use (or spatial) planning policies (see Eyles 1990; Jackson 1986; S. Smith 1989; Thomas 1988; Williams 1985). The approach of many planners to the problem is typically summarized by Thomas and Krishnarayan (1992: 17), who claim that 'a positive approach to racial and ethnic equality in planning follows from taking principles and good professional practice seriously.'
The issue goes beyond the ethical and professional aspects of planning and planners, especially in deeply divided societies. It is directly linked to a structural understanding of the relations between the state, society and space. Constant use of planning as a tool for control is likely to exacerbate social tensions. This, in turn, can lead to increasing levels of intergroup conflict and violence, thereby undermining the entire 'modernist project'. This is particularly the case in deeply divided democracies, where ethnic (and not class) cleavages dominate, and where changes to the balance of ethnic relations may have an explosive potential. The sections below attempt to begin the task of defining and theorizing the control aspect of planning, by positing that function against the original ideas of reform and progress. Later in the essay, the concepts and framework developed here will be applied to the specific case study of Arab villages in Israel's Galilee region.

The Three Dimensions of Planning Control

The use of urban and regional planning as a means of control can be usefully studied by examining three key dimensions of planning policy: territorial, procedural and socioeconomic. These dimensions embody the most critical aspects of planning as an organized field of policy and professional practice: its spatial content (the territorial dimension); its power relations and decision-making processes (the procedural dimension); and its long-term consequences (the socioeconomic dimension).

The territorial dimension is defined as the spatial and land use content of plans and policies. This may include the location of settlements, neighbourhoods, industries, commercial and social facilities, infrastructure services, and employment centres. It also includes the demarcation of administrative boundaries, according to which land use, development, and the provision of facilities and services are usually determined. Territorial policies can be used as a powerful tool of control over minorities, particularly in deeply divided societies, where ethnic groups often reside in their own regions. Planning policies can be used in such regional contexts to contain the territorial expression of such minorities, typically by imposing restrictions on minority land ownership, restricting the expansion of minority settlements, and settling members of the majority group within the minority region for control and surveillance (Marcuse, this volume). This is believed to impede the emergence of a powerful, regionally based, counter-culture, which may challenge the social and political order espoused by the central (majority controlled) state (Mikesell and Murphy 1991; Williams 1985; Yiftachel 1992b). On an urban scale, too, majority-controlled authorities can exercise (more subtle) forms of planning control, through land-use and housing policies, with the effect of creating segregation between social groups, usually according to class, race and/or ethnicity (Eyles 1999; S. Smith 1989). This process is elsewhere described as the recreation of walled cities, in which patterns of domination are expressed by physical division and spatial fragmentation (Marcuse, this volume). This, in turn, may further increase intergroup inequalities, as powerful groups would generally occupy the most desirable locations nearly exclusively, denying other groups the full share of the city's benefits and opportunities (Badcock 1984). The imposition of complex, inconsistent and unstable admini-

trative boundaries can also function as a powerful tool of control, as ordinary citizens may encounter difficulties in dealing with such systems, which are usually more familiar to the wealthy and the powerful.

The procedural dimension covers the formulation and implementation processes of plans and policies. Here planning can directly affect power relations in society by controlling access to decision-making processes (Forster 1989). The procedural dimension includes statutory aspects which formally determine the relationship between various authorities and the public, and less formal aspects such as the rate of public participation, consultation and negotiation in policy making, and the on-going relations between authorities and communities. Planning processes can be used for the exclusion of various segments and groups from meaningful participation in decision making, thereby contributing to their marginalization and repression. This form of control can be explicit, as in the case of decisions imposed 'from above', or implicit, through sophisticated methods of information distortion and meaningless forms of public consultations (Forster and Krumbholz 1990; Friedmann 1992; Hillier 1993).

The socioeconomic dimension is expressed as the long-term impact of planning on social and economic relations in society (as distinct from the immediate spatial impact). Bound up with the concept of 'planning externalities', land-use changes result in (usually indirect) positive or negative impact on neighbouring people or communities. That impact, which may include consequences such as improved accessibility, or proximity to environmental nuisance, forms an integral part of people's real income, whether it can or cannot be directly expressed in monetary terms. In that way, resources may shift between societal groups in what Harvey (1973: 100) termed 'the quiet distributive mechanism of land use planning'. Therefore, planning can be used as a tool of socioeconomic control and domination by helping to maintain and even widen socioeconomic gaps through the location of development costs and benefits in accordance with the interests of dominant groups (McLoughlin 1992). The systematic deprivation of subordinate groups by spatial policies often results in a growing level of dependence by weaker groups on dominant interests. This dependence, in turn, forms another powerful tool of socioeconomic control (Friedmann 1992; Harvey 1992).

The fact that ethnicity is the most pronounced cleavage in deeply divided societies does not reduce the importance of the socioeconomic consequences of planning. In such societies, the 'spin-offs' of negative externalities often add a class dimension to what was previously defined as a cultural-ethnic conflict (Mabin, this volume; Yiftachel 1992b). In general, and contrary to conventional wisdom, urban and regional planning is not just an arm of government which may or may not contribute to societal (modernist) reform, but also a public policy area with a potential for controlling subordinate groups, particularly in deeply divided societies (see also Mabin, this volume). This control can be exercised through the three dimensions of planning: territorial (affecting containment, surveillance and segregation), procedural (exclusion and marginalization), and socioeconomic (deprivation and dependence). Planning can therefore facilitate domination and control of three key societal resources: space, power and wealth, as will be detailed in the case study that follows.
PLANNING AS CONTROL IN PRACTICE: THE CASE OF AN URBANIZING ARAB VILLAGE IN ISRAEL

I examine here the planning of Majd el Krum—a large urbanizing Arab village in the Galilee—in order to illustrate the use of planning as a mechanism of controlling the development of an ethnic minority. The case study also illustrates how these control policies have spawned local mobilization and resistance, drawing on examples from the village’s planning history, rather than a comprehensive account (for fuller details, see Yiftachel 1993). The selection of Majd el Krum as a case study was based on several characteristics typical to the majority of Arab villages in the country: it is Muslim, average in size and rapidly growing, located in a relatively remote region, and close to several new Jewish settlements. Majd el Krum can therefore be regarded as a representative example of an Arab village in Israel.

Background

The Palestinian Arabs in Israel

Some 820,000 Palestinian–Arabs reside in Israel, constituting 16 per cent of the country’s population within its pre-1967 borders. The Arabs have lived in the country for centuries, and are currently concentrated in three main regions: the Galilee, the Triangle and the Negev (figure 15.1). Forty-seven per cent of them live in the Galilee region, where they constitute 75 per cent of the population (CBS 1992). Arabs and Jews in Israel are non-assimilating groups, divided along national, religious, linguistic, cultural and social lines. The Arabs in Israel are full citizens of the state and are entitled to the formal legal and political rights given to Jews, under Israel’s formal democratic system. They have enjoyed a range of positive consequences of living in Israel, such as rapid modernization and increasing living and educational standards (al Haj, 1988), but have also been subject to a range of discriminatory public policies (Benjamin and Mansur 1992; Lustick 1980; Zureik 1993). As a result, the Arabs have increasingly increased their struggle for civil equality in Israel, led by the National Committee of Heads of Arab Local Councils (the National Committee) and several other voluntary movements, parties and organizations (al Haj and Rosenfeld 1990).

Israel’s Planning System

The Israeli planning system is highly centralized and powerful. Its authorities are endowed with wide powers of regulation, implementation and development (Alterman and Hill 1986). The system has two principal arms: developmental and regulatory (Gertel and Law Yone 1991). Developmental planning authorities are mainly public bodies with a mandate to develop land across the country and include the Ministry of Housing, the Jewish Agency (JA) and the Jewish National Fund (JNF). Regulatory planning authorities are charged with approving urban and regional development. They operate mainly under the auspices of Israel’s Ministry of the Interior and according to Israel’s Planning

Figure 15.1 Arab and Jewish settlements in the Galilee, 1993
and Building Law (1965). The statutory system is composed of three hierarchical tiers: a national planning board, six district committees, and 121 local planning committees. Local and district committees are responsible for the preparation of statutory outline (land-use) plans for all settlements. Development in settlements without approved outline plans is illegal without the consent of the district planning committee. Quite often, when local communities do not prepare plans of their own accord, the government-appointed local committees initiate and control the formulation of statutory plans for individual settlements. This has been the case in most Arab villages.

Local historical context

Majd el Krum lies in the heart of Israel's northern region – the Galilee. The village is positioned near a famous spring at the north-western end of the fertile Bet Hakerem (or Shagur) valley (figures 15.1, 15.2), and was founded centuries ago by Muslim Arabs. Land surrounding the village has traditionally been cultivated for olives, grapes, figs, tobacco and cereal crops. In 1948, Majd el Krum reached a population of 1,400. Like most Arab villages in what is now Israel, it experienced tremendous upheavals during the 1948–9 war, when about half the village's population fled to Lebanon, while some 300 refugees from other (destroyed) Arab villages settled in the village.

The village received municipal status in 1963. Since then, a local council has been elected in regular elections and has taken control over basic municipal services, such as public health, water supply and education. However, local planning has remained the responsibility of a local planning committee appointed by the central government. During recent decades, the village has experienced many marked changes, which include: rapid spatial expansion and urbanization, sectoral shift in employment from agriculture to manual and self-employed labour, a marked rise in educational and health standards, and a steady (if slow) rise in average household incomes (see Haider 1990). At the end of 1992, the village had a population of 8,200, and a built-up area which was eight times larger than its 1948 size. Although Majd el Krum can be classified as a town, most of Majd el Krum's residents still refer to it as a 'village'.

Local planning context

Planning in and around Majd el Krum began soon after Israel gained its independence in 1948. It was manifested in a range of governmental spatial policies, programmes and activities, including the enactment of new land statutes, the building of Jewish settlements, the expansion of Jewish agriculture, the development of infrastructure, and the establishment of regional industrial centres.

Israel's land and settlement policies in the area are documented in detail elsewhere (see Carmon et al. 1991; Falah 1989; Yiftachel 1992b). In brief, the area around the village has been affected by the following policy efforts (see figures 15.1, 15.2): (1) large-scale expropriation of private Arab land, mainly during the 1950s; (2) establishment of four new Jewish settlements or 'development towns' during the 1950s and 1960s (one outside the area shown in the figures); (3) establishment of 60 small 'urbans' (rural with urban features) Jewish settlements during the late 1970s and early 1980s; (4) development of four regional industrial estates or areas during the 1970s and 1980s (one outside the area shown in the figures); and (5) continuing development of regional infrastructure, particularly roads.

The regulatory process began in Majd el Krum during 1964, when the Northern District Planning Committee assigned a 'blue line' around the village, which denoted the permitted building zone. In 1978, the local planning and building committee appointed a Haifa-based (Jewish) planner to prepare an outline plan for the village. The plan-approval process, as detailed below, was replete with delays, conflicts and problems. As a result, the plan for the village did not receive preliminary approval ('deposit') until January 1986, and was not gazetted until July 1991 – some 21 years after the statutory process had begun.

It should be stressed that due to the structure of the Israeli planning system, and the fact that the outline plan for the village was initiated and formulated by the local planning committee (that is, an Israeli government authority), the elected village council of Majd el Krum has had a very limited amount of formal influence over planning in and around the village. The planning of Majd el Krum has been carried out nearly entirely by the Israeli government (in the guise of its various provincial authorities and branches). Hence, in many respects, the case below represents a classic example of 'planning from above'.

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Figure 15.2 Bet Hakerem (Shagur) Valley and surrounding hills
TERRITORIAL CONTROL: CONTAINMENT, SURVEILLANCE AND SEGREGATION

Throughout the history of planning in and around Majd el Krum, the territorial dimension of planning implemented by government authorities has been characterized by strong elements of control over the village residents, exercised through land-ownership policies, and through the location of new settlements and municipal boundaries.

Land Ownership

Land seizure by the state

The first and most blatant instrument of territorial control has been the expropriation of village land by the state, mainly during the first three decades of Israel’s independence. Majd el Krum has lost 13,865 of the 20,065 dunams owned by village residents prior to 1948 (1 dunam equals 1,000 square metres). This represents a loss of 69 per cent of village land, which had been transferred to the state due to a range of rules and regulations described elsewhere as affecting a ‘de-Arabisation’ process of land in Israel (Benziman and Mansur 1992; Kimmerling 1983; see also Lustick 1980).

Most land loss was due to the state seizing ownership of land belonging to refugees who fled from the village during the 1948 war. This land was officially transferred to a state organ named the Development Authority, which is controlled by the Israeli Land Authority (see figure 15.3). Other land losses were due to the state confiscating land for ‘public purposes’, or assuming ownership of land for which no formal title existed (mainly those lands which were classified as ‘communal village land’ under the previous Ottoman land tenure system – see Hilali 1983). During the 1960s and 1970s, Majd el Krum lost most land due to expropriation of land (some 5,100 dunams in total) to enable the Israeli government to build and expand the town of Carmiel (figure 15.1).

This considerable loss of land occurred both in the areas surrounding the village and within the village itself (figure 15.3). It resulted in a marked decline of the reserves of both agricultural and potential building land. In addition, the widespread existence of state land within the village boundaries (a consequence of the seizure of refugee land) resulted in a high degree of land fragmentation, which in itself became an effective mechanism of control. This occurred because many developments of building and infrastructure needed to occupy state land, thereby requiring the consent of its authorities. State land would also be quite often leased back to village residents, resulting in another obvious dimension of state control over land uses and associated activities.

Land exchange

A more subtle form of territorial control has been the practice of land exchange. Under the control of the Israeli Land Authority (ILA), which manages all state land in the country, land expropriated from refugees who fled the village in 1948–9 has often been offered back to families who needed land for residential purposes (the ‘Development Authority land’ in figure 15.3). However, because Israel’s Land Act (1960) prohibits the sale of state land, the only way for an Arab household to acquire a building lot within a permitted residential zone is to exchange land with the ILA. Because many Arab households own land in areas classified as ‘agricultural’ (usually rocky, uncultivated hills around the village where the construction of housing is prohibited), the ILA has offered to exchange that land with refugee land previously expropriated within the village.

The crux of this practice has been the rate of land exchange, which in the period between 1965 and 1980 (for which data were available) stood at 1:5.3, with village residents exchanging 158.6 dunams of agricultural land for 30.1 dunams of land within the village building zone (see Yiftachel 1993: 17). Significantly, even after the exchange, the ILA would normally retain a small joint ownership of the land parcel within the village (ranging from 10 to 25 per cent). This joint ownership means that the entire lot is jointly owned, thereby insuring a continuing ILA control over building activity in the village.
Interviews with village and ILA officials revealed that this practice has been taking place for some 30 years and has continued (albeit at a slower pace) since 1980. It is not difficult to see how it has caused a major shift of land resources from Arab household, starved for residential land, to the Israeli Land Authority.

This process has also suited the ILA and the Israeli government, whose main objective has been to maximize Jewish control over land in Israel (see also Kimmerling 1983; Carmon et al. 1991: chapter 1). Accordingly, large tracts of agricultural land have been more valuable for the authorities than small, fragmented pieces of residential land. The fragmentation of residential land within the village has also added a particularly degrading human aspect: several families had to exchange land to gain control over residential lots previously belonging to a family member, often a father or an uncle! The exchange practice (which is common in most Muslim Arab villages in the Galilee) is likely to continue for some time because, as shown in figure 15.3, large tracts of village land are still owned by the ILA.

Jewish Settlement Programmes

The third main method of territorial control has been the establishment of Jewish settlements near Majd el Krum. Jewish settlement programmes have assumed different forms since Israel’s independence, but have always pursued a goal of containing the spatial development of Arab villages in general, and Majd el Krum in particular (see Kipnis 1984, 1987). As mentioned, the town of Carmiel was built in the 1960s on agricultural land expropriated from several villages, including Majd el Krum (figure 15.1).

A more explicit control of village expansion and development was embodied in the settlement programmes of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when 60 small Jewish settlements (often called mizpepin) were built in strategic sites around the Galilee. These sites were selected so as to create wedges between clusters of Arab villages and physically observe Arab building and agricultural activity in the region (Carmon et al. 1991; Newman 1984). As figure 15.2 shows, four such settlements — Lavon, Tuval, Gilion and Tzurit — were built so as to encircle and contain Majd el Krum. The first two settlements are also topographically placed immediately above the village. Despite the fact that later studies revealed that some 92 per cent of Jewish settlers in the Galilee moved to the new settlements for reasons other than assisting the control of state land, and that Arabs in the Galilee have had only a negligible rate of illegal use of state land (Carmon et al. 1991), the Jewish presence in small settlements around the village has had a marked psychological effect through the continuous observation and surveillance of everyday Arab life.

Administrative Boundaries

Another powerful means of territorial control has been the manipulation of administrative boundaries. As can be noted from figure 15.4, village residents have had to deal with a maze of boundaries, which have kept changing according to incremental decision-making by a range of Israeli authorities. This may sound like a normal case of administr-
We wish to raise the problem of planning in the Arab sector in general and in our region in particular. As the population of our five villages totals 23,000 people, a Local Committee is appropriate and will streamline the process of applying for building permits by our residents, which is currently lengthy and frustrating. It will also enable the five councils to better control development in our villages. Despite being turned down in previous meetings and correspondence we have great hope that your honour will agree to the establishment of a local planning and building committee in our region.

This request was referred to the Northern District Committee, which decided in its April 1980 meeting to refuse it because 'it was unrealistic.' The issue, which aggrieved many other Galilee villages in a similar situation to Majd el Krum, continued to appear in Arab publications and press releases throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The issue was prominently included in the official manifesto of the Arab National Committee (which amounts to a long-term political agenda of Israeli Arabs) adopted in 1987, which called for the creation of Arab-managed local building committees for groups of villages totalling 10,000 people or more.

Finally, in 1991, the authorities responded to the problem by creating a new local planning committee in the northern portion of the Galil Merkazi area. However, the new Mero'ot Nafali Committee includes only six Druze and two Jewish settlements, leaving Galil Merkazi as a large and cumbersome committee, still responsible for 15 large urbanizing (and predominantly Muslim) Arab villages, and a total population of 118,000 people. Interviews revealed that the improvement in the operation of this over-loaded committee has been minimal, if there has been any. Majd el Krum actually benefited from the changes more than other villages, with its mayor appointed as a member of the revamped Galil Merkazi Committee. However, the position is a rotating one, and the long-term problem of exclusion of the villagers from planning decision making is likely to remain in place. This is particularly significant because the local planning committee is the very planning authority which is supposed to be most accessible to local residents.

Another important procedural issue is the process of plan initiation and the on-going relations between planner and community. As mentioned, Israel's Planning and Building Law (1965) charges local planning committees with the initiation of outline plans. This does not preclude the possibility of local communities and councils initiating plans, but the lack of professional expertise in most Arab villages during the 1960s and 1970s meant that in 79 per cent of cases, plans were not initiated by Arab local authorities (Khamissi 1990). In most cases they were initiated by the relevant local planning committees, which have been perceived by villagers as totally dependent on Israel's central government. Plan initiation by the government-appointed committees meant that village planners were also appointed by these committees. The capacity both to initiate the preparation of plans and to oversee the appointment of village planners gave the authorities a powerful tool for controlling the content of plans and the pace of their progress. This has not diminished over the years, because even though Arabs have awakened to the problems of the committee-controlled process, the slow pace of plan approvals in Israel stopped them from initiating new village plans, due to the fear of further delays to their gazetted, which is a prerequisite for receiving basic services.

PROCEEDURAL CONTROL: EXCLUSION AND MARGINALIZATION

The procedural dimension of planning policies has influenced the residents of Majd el Krum through the level of their participation in the planning process, and their treatment by the authorities on procedural planning matters. Majd el Krum lies within the boundaries of the Galil Merkazi Local Planning Committee, which decides on most local planning matters, such as application for concessions, building permits, land-use change and the like. Until 1991, this committee included 23 Arab villages and six Jewish settlements in the Galilee. In 1988 the committee was responsible for the planning matters of some 133,000 people, making it the largest non-urban local planning committee in Israel. In comparison, other local committees in the Galilee, such as Misgav and Mate Asher, are responsible for only 5,000 or 7,500 people, respectively. Needless to say, the accessibility to residents from Majd el Krum of services offered by the committee has been difficult, and their potential influence on its decisions negligible (Interviews 1988–92).

The issue of a smaller and more accessible local planning committee has been a subject of continued struggle by leaders of Arab villages in the Galilee, including Majd el Krum. The five large villages in Bet Hakarem valley – Rame, Nahef, Dir el Asad, Baena and Majd el Krum (figure 15.2) – have been most active in this campaign and were led by the Majd el Krum mayor. In a letter to the Minister of the Interior, dated 4 January 1979, the mayors of the five councils state:
This was the case in Majd el Krum. The local council entered into a contract with the Galil Merkaz Local Planning Committee and a Haifa-based (Jewish) planner in November 1978, to prepare an outline plan for the village within a year. The plan approval process suffered a lengthy series of delays, which occurred partially due to 'objective' planning problems, such as illegal construction, or problems associated with the widening of narrow roads in dense neighbourhoods, and difficulties in complying with district planning standards.

A critical contribution to these delays, however, was made by the alienation between the planner and the community. In 1985 and 1986, for example, seven letters were received by the appropriate planning authorities from the mayor of Majd el Krum, accusing the planner of a lack of ethics and professional incompetence, and blaming him for the distortion of facts and dates. Some of these letters were answered by the planner who, in turn, accused the council of lack of control over its 'law breaking residents' and the distortion of facts. In January 1988 the Majd el Krum Council resolved to ask the Galil Merkaz Local Committee to replace the appointed planner with another, a request later refused by the committee's chairman. After 1988, however, all work on the plan was carried out by the local council itself (or by professionals it hired on an ad-hoc basis) in clear defiance of the local committee's decision.

The conflict between the planner and the village is not in itself of particular interest, but the consequences of this lengthy stalemate are. They included: (1) a steady increase in illegal dwelling construction in the village (due to the lack of an approved plan); and (2) a bizarre situation where a planner who in principle should have helped the community was perceived by villagers as working against their interests and needs (Interviews 1988-92). To illustrate, a letter by the mayor to the Israeli Ministry of the Interior dated 18 January 1988 states: 'I wish to stress that the planning of our village (by the appointed planner) as expressed in the outline plan is done in a shoddy manner... the appointed planner acts on his own accord without considering the needs of the village and its people.'

Most significantly for this discussion, the lengthy approval process caused by the alienation between the local authority and the planner has given the authorities an effective tool of control: in the absence of an approved plan, every single application needs to be processed by both (government-appointed) local and district committees, thereby marginalizing the legitimate wishes of the local community. Overall, procedural policies and practices have been used by Israel's planning authorities as a method of effective control over the Arabs by excluding the villagers from planning decision making, and by marginalizing their needs and aspirations.

SOCIOECONOMIC CONTROL: DEPRIVATION AND DEPENDENCE

In general, little attention has been paid by Israel's planning authorities to economic and social policies in Majd el Krum. The most discernible social and economic impact on the residents of Majd el Krum has been indirect, as a result of policies which targeted other areas, or as a consequence of neglect and inaction. In economic terms, the residents of Majd el Krum have benefited quite substantially from the establishment of Carmiel—a Jewish city of some 28,000 residents, four kilometres east of the village (figure 15.1). The main benefit has been the availability of employment. A survey conducted in 1989 among all industries in the Carmiel industrial area revealed that 211 employees were from Majd el Krum, constituting 12 per cent of the village workforce (Yiftachel 1991a). More employment is found by villagers in Carmiel in most menial service areas (such as cleaning and car servicing), retail, food outlets and some low-skilled white-collar jobs. It has been estimated by council officials that some 25 per cent of the village's workforce is employed in Carmiel.

Another indirect influence on the economy of the village has been the large-scale building activity in the Galilee during the last 15 years. A quarter of the village's workforce is employed in the building industry, with considerable work obtained in building projects tied to Jewish settlement in the Galilee. Yet the indirect benefit of available employment in Jewish enterprises has come at a considerable cost: the village economy has been stagnant since 1948. It was estimated by council officials that in mid-1992, 90 per cent of the workforce was employed outside the village. This has occurred because government policies have indirectly worked to retard the local economy, because the previously agrarian village economy lacked an industrial foundation, and because Arab entrepreneurship has been very limited (Czamanski and Taylor 1986). In short, the village economy became nearly totally dependent on external (mainly Jewish) sources.

In particular, two key policies have impeded economic development in the village: (1) the seizure of most agricultural land, as referred to earlier, drastically reduced local agricultural employment; this has been augmented by severe restriction on the supply of water for irrigation (Falah 1990); (2) unlike the case of the heavily supported Jewish settlements and enterprises in the Galilee, there has been a total lack of incentives for local economic development in Arab villages in general, and Majd el Krum in particular; this has occurred despite the surrounding region being declared as a priority development zone by Israel's Ministry of Industry. The above policies have worked to reinforce the deprivation of Arabs in the region, especially when compared to its Jewish inhabitants (see Haidar 1990; Semyonov and Levi Epstein 1987).

The local council, like most Arab municipalities, has suffered continuous financial problems, which seriously hampered its ability to supply the village community with the basic services it is responsible for: education, internal roads, public health facilities, recreation and local planning. These services tend to be of low standards in the village, especially when compared to the modern and well-serviced Jewish settlements in the vicinity. Two main factors underpin the funding and servicing problem of the local authority: (1) a chronic shortage of government financial assistance, which amounts to only a third of the funding given to Jewish local authorities (on a per capita basis—see al Haj and Rosenfeld 1990); (2) internal social tensions and problems associated with tax levy within the village, which restrict the revenue-raising powers of the local authority through local taxes and charges (for more details, see al Haj and Rosenfeld 1990; Haidar 1991). (Significantly, Majd el Krum's servicing problems are not related to council
inefficiencies and improper conduct, which have plagued many other Arab local authorities. In 1991, the local council received the 'efficiency prize' from Israel's Ministry of the Interior."

In general, however, government policies (together with a range of local factors) have led the village to become largely dependent on the Jewish sector for its economic and social needs. In economic terms, Majd el Krum has been turned into a large (and cheap) labour pool for Jewish entrepreneurs and government agencies. In social terms, the local community has been deprived of the level of services and facilities widely available to their Jewish neighbours. The result has been the addition of a distinct class dimension to the territorial and procedural tensions highlighted earlier in the essay.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF PLANNING CONTROL: POPULAR RESISTANCE

Having demonstrated the pervasive and systematic use of planning as a powerful method of control over an ethnic minority, it is important to examine the consequence of these policies on the politics of majority-minority relations. This is especially important in democratic regimes, such as Israel, where minorities enjoy a range of political and individual rights which enable them to react against unfavourable policies with relatively few legal constraints. Most theories of ethnic relations predict rising levels of resistance and social and political conflict in the case of persistent majority-minority disparities (see, for example: Gurr 1993; Gurr and Lichbach 1986; Lane and Erzon 1990). Post-structuralist theorists postulate that, increasingly, 'modernist'-rational social control methods 'from above' are likely to be met by resistance 'from below' (Foucault 1980).

This process is intimately tied up with the restructuring of the world economy and intergroup politics during the last three decades (Friedmann 1987; Berry and Huxley 1992; Yiftachel and Alexander 1993).

Protest Activity

While several ways of resistance have been evident in the village of Majd el Krum (including electoral behaviour and expressions of regime illegitimacy), I will concentrate on the most pervasive and persistent form of resistance: popular protest against the Israeli government and its policies. In this analysis protest events were divided into three categories, according to the main issue around which action was organized: (1) against planning policies, (2) against other public policies, and (3) on National-Palestinian matters. Planning policies were defined as the combination of policies issued and implemented by the Israeli planning system, as described earlier.

Figure 15.5 displays the main temporal trends in anti-governmental protest and violence in Majd el Krum since 1975 (the date from which data were available). The analysis includes protest events which occurred entirely within the confines of the village, and regional and national events in which local residents have taken an active part. The graph shows that a general increase has occurred in protest activity by residents of Majd el Krum during the study period, indicating a growing level of resistance to Israel's control policies. Figure 15.5 shows that: peaks in protest activity were recorded in four key periods: 1976-7, 1984, 1987 and 1989. These periods correspond with changes in Israeli policies in the region or the village, which usually entailed the introduction of new policies. The main policy events during these periods were as follows:

1 In 1976, large tracts of village land were expropriated for the expansion of the nearby Jewish town of Carmiel, and in 1977 two unauthorized dwellings were demolished in the village.
2 In 1984, an organized Arab campaign took place to modify the boundaries of the newly created (Jewish) Misgav regional council, which incorporated vast areas of private Arab land.
3 In 1987, the Arabs in Israel intensified their campaign for civil equality, culminating in several general strikes and large demonstrations; in late 1987, the outbreak of the Intifada (uprising in the occupied territories) also caused several large-scale protest activities across the country and in Majd el Krum.
4 In 1989, two main events dominated: the continuing Intifada which received widespread verbal and political (but generally not violent) support in the Galilee, and another crackdown on unauthorized dwellings by the government, under which 15 houses were demolished in one day in another Arab village.

Figure 15.5 also shows that the volume of protest against planning policies has remained relatively steady over the study period, with notable peaks during civic struggles against the government's main planning initiatives discussed earlier. In addition, since the mid-1980s, the campaign to close the gap between Arab and Jewish municipal budgets has played a major role in Arab protest activity, especially during periods of concerted efforts on the matter, such as 1984-5 and 1990-1. While reaction to Israeli policies has played a key role in generating Arab protest, other factors have contributed to its steady rise. These have included the general rise of protest activity in Israel as a whole (Lehman-Wilzig 1990) and a growing level of politicization among Arabs in Israel (Smooha 1992).

Equally significant are the 'troughs' in figure 15.5, which represent the periods of relative calm. During the early 1980s, for example, the village enjoyed a period of some
progress, with a new high school being built and no immediate threats apparent for dwellings built without licence. Most importantly, during the 1985–6 period, protest and violence declined, mainly because a more liberal Labour-led government took office for a short period. That government paid particular attention to the needs of the Arab sector in general, and Galilee villages in particular.

A notable government initiative during that period was the return of 'Area 9' for the exclusive use of Arab farmers. Area 9 is an Arab-owned agricultural area some five kilometres south-east of Majd el Krum, which for years was used by the Israeli army for military exercises. Its return to exclusive Arab use was interpreted as a goodwill gesture by the government, and had a significant calming influence on Arab–Jewish relations in the Galilee during that period. In addition, 1986 was the year when Arab local authorities in the Galilee reached a compromise with the government on the issue of municipal boundaries, thereby further contributing to the lull in anti-government protest and violence. Also better representation of village leadership in some regional authorities and committees since 1990, and the gazettal of the village outline plan in 1991, relaxed the level of protest intensity during 1990–1, against the context of continuing Israeli–Palestinian tension in the occupied territories (Interviews 1988–92).

A broad positive association can be discerned between Israel's policies in the region and the village (with a prominent role for planning policies) and changes in the nature of local resistance. Policies which emphasized control over the minority (such as land expropriation and house demolition) have triggered anti-governmental protest and violence, thereby increasing the long-term levels of Arab–Jewish conflict. Conversely, policies which advanced consultation and compromise affected a reduction in the level of anti-governmental protest.

Resistance and Policy Change

The steady campaign of resistance by the villagers against Israeli policies has not, by and large, caused major policy shifts or the initiation of new, more responsive government programmes. However, a gradual decline in the level of control over the village development and its people can be discerned in recent years, partially as a result of the growing local assertiveness. This change has been piecemeal and inconsistent, and is yet to be backed by comprehensive strategies. Nevertheless, it has appeared in several policy areas, as illustrated by the following examples:

1 **Territorial policies.** The large-scale land expropriation common in the 1980s, 1990s and 1970s has all but stopped; house demolitions have not occurred since 1979; and no new Jewish settlements have been established around the village since the early 1980s. Also, in 1986, as a response to well-organized Arab protest against the boundaries of the Misgav regional council mentioned above (figure 15.1), the authorities have enlarged the municipal boundaries of most Arab local authorities in the Galilee (including Majd el Krum), thereby increasing the extent of local territorial control.

2 **Procedural policies.** The voice of the local people is increasing being taken into account, albeit mainly in an informal manner. Interviews with policy makers revealed that the delays and exclusion used by the authorities to sidestep Arab input into the planning process are proving increasingly difficult. Local residents have become more familiar with Israel's planning system, with their legal rights, and with the intricacies of political lobbying and informal pressure on decision makers. Most recently, for example, in 1992 several villagers proposed a new southern route for the major Akko-Zefat road which bisects the village (figure 15.2). The proposed new southern route alleviated a demolition threat hanging over many dwellings situated within the statutory easement of that road. The proposal was adopted by the local council, which convinced the authorities to consider it seriously. This marks an initiative 'from below' which was virtually impossible in previous years.

3 **Socioeconomic policies.** The large gap between government funding of Arab and Jewish local authorities has been constantly declining (from a ratio of 1:12 in the 1950s to a ratio of 1:3 in the late 1980s: see al Haj and Rosenfeld 1990). Further progress has also been recently achieved in the implementation of plans to provide the village with a deep sewerage system, which is currently under construction. In early 1993, Arab settlements were included for the first time in the classification for priority settlements, with incentives for investors and residents. This has equalized their status with their neighbouring Jewish settlements, after decades of unequal treatment.

While these signs of policy change are undoubtedly linked to the Arab campaign of protest and resistance, other factors in this process should not be ignored. These include Israel's democratic structure which allows (and even facilitates) the expression of minority grievances; the state's welfare provision which enabled the Arabs to develop a respectable educational infrastructure and short-term pragmatic consideration by Israeli politicians, who often need Arab support in their respective levels of government. Finally, the 1992 election of the Labour government signalled a certain policy change, with the declaration of policy goals more responsive to Arab needs and aspirations than those of the previous Likud administration. Overall, grassroots resistance to control policies in Majd el Krum has had a notable mark on the gradual (partial) change in the direction of these policies.

**CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS**

In this essay I have demonstrated in detail how planning policies, which were conceived by the early founders of planning as tools for reform and modernization, can be systematically used for the opposite purpose of controlling a minority population. The control of the Arabs in Majd el Krum was put into practice through the territorial, procedural and socioeconomic dimensions of planning policies. Planning policies were therefore an integral part of the repression of the Arabs, reinforcing patterns of spatial, procedural and socioeconomic inequalities and deprivation.

The analysis has also shown that there are limits to the control of minorities in a democratic system. In recent years, the residents of Majd el Krum, like other Palestinian Arabs in Israel, have started to mount more assertive resistance to the policies described
above. This has resulted in some (albeit minor) policy concessions, which started to challenge pre-existing patterns of Jewish domination and control. On the basis of the case studied here, it is clear that traditional centralist planning methods imposed 'from above' are likely to encounter increasing levels of resistance 'from below', thereby creating social conflicts and intergroup tension. As noted at the outset, much planning research has concentrated so far on studying how planning can (or cannot) contribute to a 'public good'. While this research agenda is commendable, it bears little relevance to the understanding of the regressive type of planning explored in this essay. Planning theorists need to devote their attention to the question of 'control', which is more prevalent than past research would let us believe (see also Huxley 1993).

This essay has made a tentative start in the task of studying the phenomenon of 'planning as control'. Much more theoretical, empirical and comparative research is needed to understand that phenomenon fully. The challenge is clear: we must broaden and deepen our understanding of the causes, consequences and use of (traditional, modernist) planning methods to control minority populations. Such understanding not only will help us to interpret social and spatial processes fully, but may also facilitate the transition towards more appropriate forms of shaping the built environment: from planning for control, containment, exclusion and deprivation, onto planning for emancipation, inclusion, empowerment and equity.

NOTES

1 Data for the study were collected from a variety of sources, most notably: the archives of the Majd el Krum local authority and the Northern District branch of Israel's Ministry of the Interior; an extensive search of local and national newspapers; interviews with local Arab leaders and decision makers in government and public authorities; aerial photographs; and field surveys. The main methods used for the study included analysis of: (1) the content and implementation of relevant policies; (2) public reactions to these policies, and (3) changes over time of these variables.

REFERENCES


