THEORETICAL NOTES ON ‘GRAY CITIES’: THE COMING OF URBAN APARTHEID?

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Abstract The author analyzes the political geography of globally expanding urban informalities. These are conceptualized as ‘gray spaces’, positioned between the ‘whiteness’ of legality/approval/safety, and the ‘blackness’ of eviction/destruction/death. The vast expansion of gray spaces in contemporary cities reflects the emergence of new types of colonial relations, which are managed by urban regimes facilitating a process of ‘creeping apartheid’. Planning is a lynchpin of this urban order, providing tools and technologies to classify, contain and manage deeply unequal urban societies. The author uses a ‘South-Eastern’ perspective to suggest the concept of ‘planning citizenship’ as a possible corrective horizon for analytical, normative and insurgent theories.

Keywords apartheid, colonial relations, gray space, informality, urban regime

In the following article I wish to link insights from my recent involvement with marginalized urban communities, with conceptual observations about the political geography of urban informalities (‘gray spaces’) and the subsequent emergence of what I conceptualize as ‘creeping urban apartheid’. What follows is an exploratory and somewhat speculative article, undoubtedly needing further empirical backing and theoretical underpinning. Let me begin with two voices from the Beer Sheva metropolitan region, Israel/Palestine:
Beer Sheva belongs to us, as much as to the Jews... we are staying on our traditional land, and close to the city that was built for us by the Ottomans... the Jews want us to move to ‘planned’ (or ‘ghetto’) towns, but we refuse in order to defend our land... every week they demolish a few of our ‘illegal’ homes... but they cannot evict us, because they know we’ll always return... (‘Attiyya al-‘Athameen, Bedouin land owner, the unrecognized locality of Chashem Zaneh, near Beer Sheva)

This is the fourth time I am sacked in Israel and probably not the last... I came here eight years ago to work... I could get into Israel because my ex-husband’s son is Jewish. No, I cannot become a citizen, but I can extend my visa annually. I will work here for about five more years and then return to Kiev... it’s OK here, because I can save some money and send it home, and there are many Russian speakers... but the work situation sucks... (Svetlana, a recently sacked Ukrainian cleaning worker, Beer Sheva, 2008)

The two voices come from two marginalized communities in an urban region which has recently reached a population of 550,000. ‘Attiya is a Bedouin Arab from a group of 36 ‘unrecognized’ indigenous Bedouin localities, accommodating around 70,000 people. This population is designated for eviction according to the latest 2007 metropolitan plan for the Beer Sheva. Svetlana is a temporary labor migrant, one of some 10–15,000 such workers in the region, employed chiefly in menial services, dangerous occupations and the sex trade. Svetlana is a member of a recently formed union of cleaning workers, organized after mass sackings in one of the city’s major institutions.

Beyond the human sufferings associated with home demolitions and chronic employment insecurity, lie structural forces. These ‘produce’ the spaces in which residents such as Attiya and Svetlana are only partially incorporated into the urban community, economy and space, and are excluded from membership in the city polity. These partially incorporated people, localities and activities are part of a growing urban informality, termed here ‘gray space’ – positioned between the ‘whiteness’ of legality/approval/safety, and the ‘blackness’ of eviction/destruction/death. They are neither integrated nor eliminated, forming pseudo-permanent margins of today’s urban regions.

Gray spaces contain a multitude of groups, bodies, housing, lands, economies and discourses, lying literally ‘in the shadow’ of the formal, planned city, polity and economy. They exist partially outside the gaze of state authorities and city plans. With studies beginning in South America and moving worldwide, expanding informality in cities is now well documented in areas such as land, housing, immigration and economy. Informality has come to characterize a vast number of metropolitan regimes, to the extent that more than half the population can be classified as ‘informal’ (see Davis, 2006; Neuwrith, 2006; Roy, 2005). Around Jewish Beer Sheva, gray spaces are evident by sprawling expanses of Arab shanty towns and villages, made mostly of tin and wooden shacks. They are also evident in ‘illegal’ and temporary urban residents mainly in the dilapidated Ottoman city and the adjacent impoverished neighborhoods.

In the urban policy sphere, including planning, gray spaces are usually tolerated quietly, often even encouraged, while being engaged within discourses of ‘contamination’, ‘criminality’ and ‘public danger’ to the desired ‘order of things’.
Typically, the concrete emergence of ‘stubborn’ informalities is ‘handled’ not through corrective or equalizing policy, but through by a range of delegitimizing and criminalizing discourses. This creates boundaries that divide urban groups according to their status – a process of ‘separating incorporation’. This double-edged move tends to preserve gray spaces, activities and populations in ‘permanent temporariness’ – concurrently tolerated and condemned, perpetually waiting ‘to be corrected’.

Gray spaces have increasingly come to characterize urban regions of late capitalist/nationalist era, especially, but far from solely, in the global South-East. They define and then contain a range of marginalized and essentialized ‘castes’ in the emerging urban regimes of our times. Further exploration of this phenomenon reveals that the uneven incorporation of groups and spaces, points to the re-appearance of colonial relations to today’s cities. This has become a common form of de facto metropolitan governance.

**Return of the colonial?**

The plight of ‘Attiya and Svetlana in Beer Sheva represents two faces of contemporary urban colonial relations. Here ‘Colonial’ does not relate necessarily to European (capital ‘C’) Colonialism, or to the subsequent ‘postcolonial’ relations. Rather, it refers to a multi-faceted and broader understanding of regulating power to facilitate the process of seizure and appropriation, under which the urban political economy is based on several key principles:

a) expansion of dominant interests (spatially or otherwise)

b) exploitation of marginalized groups;

c) essentialization of identities; based on institutionalization of ‘different and unequal’; and

d) hierarchical and coerced segregation.

Drawing inspiration from thinkers such as Agamben (2006), Holston (2007), Jacobs (1998), Marcuse (2007 [AQ: check date, 2002 in refs list?!]), Mbembe (2005 [AQ: check date, 2003 in refs list?!]), Roy (2000) and Samaddar (2007), and adopting a broadly ‘neo-Gramscian’ framework, help us analyze the stories of Svetlana and Attiya as representing different historical and political trajectories through which urban colonial relations are formed. Both, however, represent a direct result of the uneven incorporation of gray spaces into the everyday of today’s globalizing urban societies, under the hegemonic forces of neoliberal economy and associated identity orders, such as nationalism, ethnicity, race and religion. This may not be universal, as some urban regions do not (yet?) display the kind of colonial relations describe above. Nevertheless, it is a growing phenomenon, meaning that the Beer Sheva metropolis, as well as Israel/Palestine, are not an exception, but rather a hyper-example of structural relations unfolding in thousands of cities around the changing globe.

The urban scene is pivotal to the understanding of the new order, because it combines both ‘old’ and ‘new’ types of colonial relations. The former alludes to expansion ‘from above’ of an ethnic or national group, mainly with the active
assistance of the state, into urban territories previously controlled by other collectivities. This movement creates ‘urban frontiers’, where sovereignty and group territorialities are contested typically through development projects, land allocation, militarized control or disinvestment. Well known examples are Belfast, Sarajevo, Beirut, Jerusalem, Ahmadabad, Johannesburg, Grozni or Colombo, to name just a few.

The latter (‘new’ colonial relations) can be described as ‘centripetal’ or ‘inverse’ or colonialism, denoting a centralizing process generated ‘from below’ in which continuous (internal and international) urban immigration of unregistered, marginalized, temporary or ‘floating’ groups settle in the metropolis. This process is described by Bayat (2007) as ‘the slow encroachment of the ordinary’ and by Perera (2002) as the ‘indigenization of the plan’. Such processes stretch beyond binary colonizer–colonized relations, and result in expanding informal and unauthorized development, enabled by increasing migration, as well as a neoliberalizing, semi-privatized spatial order. Examples abound and include many of the large metropolitan regions in South America, Africa and Asia (see also Angotti, 2006; Davis, 2006; Neuwrith, 2006; Roy, 2005).

The distinction between the two types of colonial relations is of course mainly analytical. ‘On the ground’ the two phenomena are rarely mutually exclusive, as colonized ethnic minorities often build their own informal settlements or migrate into existing ones. The urban frontier tends to produce a chain reaction of dislocations in which state-sanctioned planned activities coercively disperse groups into new informal and unplanned gray spaces. At the same time migrant movements create their own frontiers and their own sets of urban displacements and relocations (see also Roy, 2002; Tzfadia and Yacobi, 2007).

Gray space ‘from above’?

In June 2008, in one of Beer Sheva’s central hotels, a planning appeal tribunal convened to discuss objections to the latest metropolitan plan for Beer Sheva. The readers may recall that the plan proposed to ‘relocate’ (that is, evict) 36 unrecognized localities, among them Chashem Zaneh. The following exchange between ‘Attiya and the District planner at the tribunal is highly illustrative of the urban colonial process:

‘Atiyya al-’Athameen: we demand to move the highway planned on top of our locality . . . this road will bisect, and hence destroy our settlement, where 2200 people live. We were here before the planning law and even before the state. We are citizens whose basic rights should be protected . . . The road can wait and should be re-planned in a different location . . .

The Chief District Planner: . . . unfortunately, the Bedouins will have to move, because they are illegally occupying state land . . . we are preparing good alternatives for them . . . and beside – they are blocking private investment in the region . . . the new highway is necessary for encouraging such investment . . . we have already some proposals for investment in that area . . . also – the road will connect the new planned army bases . . . I know these bases are not shown on the plan, but I am sure they will be built soon . . .
Beyond the threat of a forced eviction of an indigenous group, there is another issue, namely the forming of gray space ‘from above’. The issue of future investment and army bases, both proposed outside the metropolitan plan in question, portray gray space as not being confined to the deprived urban fringe. It also exists at the privileged edges, those which straddle the ‘high’ boundaries of the power systems, exempted from strict legal compliance. These include powerful actors grouped under the generalizing rubric ‘development’, ‘security’ or ‘national needs’. The most powerful contravention of planning rules from ‘above’ occurs when all three elements are combined.

Given the gradual retreat of governments from regulating urban development in the name of ‘letting the market do the job’, it is now well known that city planning has come to resemble an entrepreneurial agent, seeking to maximize growth, efficiency and accumulation (see Harvey, 2002). Under an increasing neoliberal culture or ‘urban developmentalism’ (Roy, 2002), planning is structurally inclined to wave planning rules to developments that regularly contravene urban policies (see Marcuse, 2002).

Beyond accommodating capital, security and national interests, gray spaces are sanctioned ‘from above’ through benign tolerance and even facilitation of groups favored by the regime. These may include private ‘settlers’ in areas of ethnic conflict, bohemians and artists in areas of urban renewal, or religious institutions in areas lacking social services.

The understanding of gray space as stretching over the entire spectrum, from powerful developers to landless and homeless ‘invaders’, helps us conceptualize two associated dynamics we may be term here ‘whitening’ and ‘blackening’. The former alludes to the tendency of the system to ‘launder’ gray spaces created ‘from above’ by powerful or favorable interests. The latter denotes the process of ‘solving’ the problem of marginalized gray space by destruction, expulsion or elimination. The state’s violent power is put into action, turning gray into black.

We can therefore perceive gray space as a potential zone of societal transformation. For powerful groups, entering the gray zone would often derive from a calculated risk for achieving net economic and political gains. For some marginalized groups, too, transgressing legal space may carry the potential of ‘whitening’ and with the associated social upgrading and blessed stabilization. On the other hand, for most peripheral groups it is created by necessity and is associated with some considerable dangers: it could be severely punished, throwing the group into financial disaster, property loss, injury or even exile.

In most cases, however, gray space will not be eliminated, but maintained by a ‘politics of un-recognition’ accompanied by marginalizing indifference. It will be typically ‘flanked’ by contradictory discursive movements. On the one hand, professional and political denial (of its very existence, as well as the denial of services, status or legitimacy), while on the other a persistent discourse of ‘othering’, and an occasional ‘performance’ of punitive threat. There is no room here to properly analyze the set of interests that create and maintain gray space, except to note that its partial inclusion serves important aspects of the local economy, while its exclusion from full membership serves political and identity...
interests. As explained elsewhere (Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2004), gray space is caught between the logics of capital, governance and identity.

Urban planning – that is, the combination of relevant spatial policies – is often behind both the existence and criminalization of gray space. Urban plans design the city’s ‘white’ spaces which usually create little or no opening for inclusion/recognition of most informal localities and population, while their discourse continuously condemns them as a chaotic danger to the city. Under these circumstances we must of course consider selective non-planning as part of planning, and as a form of active or negligent exclusion. In these pervasive settings planning is far from a profession promoting just and sustainable urbanism; it is rather a system managing profound societal inequalities – a system of ‘creeping apartheid’.

‘Creeping apartheid’?

The various configurations of gray space result, so I argue, in a process of ‘creeping urban apartheid’. Why ‘apartheid’? Because membership in the urban community is stratified and essentialized, creating a range of unequal urban citizenship(s). The inequalities between residents of the same city are most typically found in basic rights to property, services and political power. The gradation of rights and capabilities are commonly based on inscribed classifications, such as race, ethnicity, class, caste and place of birth, creating and upholding a basic apartheid setting – one land, many legal statuses. Significantly for planning theorists, tools for classifying and stratifying groups often derive from the grids and categories laid by urban planning.

Urban plans provide the authorities with an arsenal of categories to define and treat gray space and bodies, such as ‘illegal resident/immigrant’, ‘un-approved development’, ‘illegal housing’, or ‘land invasion’, or alternatively – ‘necessary development’, ‘new employment provider’, ‘urban regeneration’ or in the colonial settings discussed here, also ‘buffer zones’ and ‘security enhancement’. These categories, like many others, translate planning regulations into a system of civil stratification, whereby those occupying gray spaces are either streamlined or separated membership. In this context, consider the statement of a member in the Beer Sheva Planning Committee, commenting on the distortion of city plans for commercial areas by large developers:

In the case of Beer Sheva the process was quite simple: commercial developers purchased large tracts of cheap and contaminated industrial land, and developed several shopping centers . . . these did not match our city plan . . . however, they applied to the Council – after commencing construction – and received ‘temporary’ approval . . . this was granted in most cases, and is valid until today . . . the temporary setting is available because our formal plan is not approved yet . . . I agree that formally this bordered on illegal construction but there is a geographic-political reality here – no mayor can refuse today an offer of urban investment . . .

The differential treatment of unauthorized and often illegal construction between ‘whitened’ commercial developments and ‘blackened’ demolished
Bedouins homes mentioned earlier, needs no further illustration. To capture this structural reality, I prefer the term ‘creeping apartheid’ to softer descriptions such as ‘discrimination’ or ‘inequality gaps’, because the transformation of cities in our age is profound. The inferior position of marginalized gray spaces and groups is not simply a result of ‘discrimination’ but the consequence of deeply embedded institutional, material and spatial systems which accord unequal ‘packages’ of rights and capabilities to the various groups, as well as fortify the separation between them.

If so, then why ‘creeping’? Because in most cases, the discriminatory ‘apartheid’ order is obviously not officially declared, and at times not even desired. Yet, given structural constraints, it is ‘creeping’ into the daily governance of urban society and gradually changing its regime through incremental regulation and institutionalization. In other words, over time the ‘ladder’ of urban civil status is partially institutionalized through the ongoing implementation of urban policy, service delivery and a range of discriminatory daily practices. In this vein, consider Svetlana’s comment about receiving basic services:

We need special permission from the council to receive water, electricity, telephone, etc. . . . we are not entitled to any housing or tax benefits as do Israelis . . . but the worst is health: when we come to a clinic to see a doctor, we always have to wait till the end, because we cannot belong to a health fund, and hence cannot have proper appointments . . . many prefer to go to a private doctor if their papers are not in order, so they are not ‘discovered’ . . . getting services is like asking for favors all the time . . .

Such institutionalization creates increasingly predictable patterns of institutions, regulations, discourses and disciplinary practices, all aimed at dealing with the relations between gray spaces and bodies and the sanctioned ‘white’ space of the urban. When these patterns crystallize into a relatively stable manner of managing the metropolis, we can begin to discern an urban regime – an institutionalized power system controlling space and population.

The term ‘urban regime’ became popular in urban scholarship, mainly during the 1990s (see Lauria, 1997; Stone, 1989). It was, however, largely confined to the Anglo-Saxon world, to understand development coalitions and ‘growth machines’. Here I wish to broaden this useful term and link it to the general social science concept of ‘regime’ which denotes an institutionalized logic of power. Regimes define, maintain and evolve ‘the accepted order of things’ in the public spheres, alluding not only to economics, but also to identities, governance and cultural norms. Regimes are often identified according to the most prominent characteristics of the power structure – democratic, ethnocratic, theocratic, authoritarian, totalitarian, communist, and so on.

Why does the apartheid ‘order of things’ continue to be consolidated in metropolitan regions around the world? A key factor, so my argument goes, is their ability to successfully manage the new colonial relations. These regimes allow established groups to maintain and deepen their urban privileges in the wake of profound demographic change. They use a range of discourses, classifications and technologies to rank the rights of urban groups and individuals,
based on ethnic identity, economic position, land holdings, political standing, or any combination of the above.

The term ‘metropolis’ itself, we should remember, harbors distinct colonial connotations. Already in ancient Greece it meant a ‘mother city’ to the chain of colonies spread in the ‘diaspora’ (see Agamben, 2006). During modern times, European ‘metropolitan’ society came to mark the colonial state, controlling its distant colonies. During the 21st century, with the advent of ‘gray’ spaces and populations, colonial elements return to characterize metropolitan societies, although in a different ‘inverse’ trajectory.

But caution is in order. First, urban regimes, be they democratic, ethnocratic or apartheid-like, do not exist in isolation, and have not replaced states. They are embedded in the political legal geographies of globalizing states. As nodal points in state and global networks, their influence often challenges existing borders, but states still preside over organized violence, border controls, citizenship and immigration. The monopoly that states once had over these spheres is indeed diminishing while urban political power is changing and strengthening (see Yacobi, 2007), but urban regimes are still constrained by the fields of state and international powers (see Brenner, 2007; Sidaway, 2007).

And further qualification: urban regimes are not likely to be defined formally as are states, with clear boundaries, constitutions, legal systems and formal citizenship. They evolve with a pastiche of ‘patched’ and partially overlapping ‘medieval-like’ power systems (see alSayyad and Roy, 2006). There is no room in this article to seriously deal with the important urban-state debate (see Brenner, 2007; Sidaway, 2007; Taylor, 2007), except to note the growing centrality of urban systems that shape people’s lives (that is, their substantive citizenship), through the materiality, politics and subjectivity of urban existence (see Samaddar, 2007).

A comparative touch

My recent empirical and theoretical work has focused on metropolitan processes in ethnocratic states, in which liberalizing pressures interact with powerful ethno-religious or racialized narratives and territorialities. A comparative approach took me to sites outside Palestine/Israel, such as Tallinn, Colombo, Perth, Cape Town and Jerusalem. For a long time, minorities in most of these cities have suffered the status of second-class citizens, being on the fringe of politics, economy and culture in states devoted to ‘ethnicize’ the public sphere and assert total control of the dominant ethnos (see Forman and Kedar, 2004; Yiftachel, 2006, 2007).

Yet, these cities are not replicas of their states. The urban setting does make a difference, with its relative openness that allows minorities to mobilize for their rights in a way not possible on the state level. For example, during 2007 and 2008, Colombo authorities made several attempts to evict ‘unauthorized’ Tamil internal refugees, who reside in temporary housing. Over 700 people were evicted, but this action provoked Tamil and human rights groups to mobilize wide urban and international pressure against this policy, causing the authorities to halt the ‘operation’ and even issue an apology.
Similarly, the large Russian minority in Tallinn, rallied in mass violent protest that lasted several days in May 2007, when city leaders decided to remove a Red Army statue from one of the city squares, in order to erase reference to the Soviet past. Most Russians occupy a sort of gray space – they are not citizens of Estonia but are permanent residents of Tallinn. Their mobilization in the aftermath of the statue removal caused city officials to launch a range of appeasing statements and policies towards the minority.

In Cape Town, landless members of the ‘Eighth Street’ community, in the Mitchell Planes, occupied an empty site for several years, near the planned neighborhood of Halvalla. City authorities tried to violently evict them twice, but their organized resistance, and enduring life in appalling conditions was recently rewarded, when the City of Cape Town (previously the Cape Town Metropolitan Council) recognized the community, and began a formalization process of land and housing.

Just like the Bedouins around Beer Sheva, the protesting groups in Colombo, Tallinn and Cape Town have mobilized not just for their own (very important) local demands, but also to assert their urban citizenship. By protesting and negotiating the terms of ‘whitening’ their gray space, these minority movements staked a claim to belonging to the city and its political community. The point here is that this kind of mobilization is far more likely on an urban, than on a state level, where state economic and identity agendas are deeply enshrined.

The vignettes from the three cities highlight another phenomenon: marginalized gray spaces and populations are never merely passive victims in the process of urbanization. They often use their territorial and/or political exclusion to develop a strong sense of identity and mobilize persistent struggles. But despite their partial gains, the conditions of minorities in these cities is still a far cry from attaining ‘planning citizenship’ on which we touch on below.

**Back to theory**

Planning has become a lynchpin in this emerging order. The urbanization of politics, and the amplification of gray spaces, have meant that control over development, urban services, boundary making, housing and communal recognition is gradually increasing in importance. Hence, urban planning becomes a potentially powerful governing tool with which to shape people’s lives and subjectivities. Planning (or lack of) provides the authorities with a set of technologies with which they can legalize, criminalize, incorporate or evict. Planning categories and mechanisms allow the loci of power to construct or destroy, ‘whiten’ or ‘blacken’ urban development and populations. The negotiation of gray space, either locally or regionally, has become in many cities the stuff of urban politics itself.

After many years of silence, the theoretical literature has begun to address this phenomenon, with important works of authors such as alSayyad and Roy (2004), Bayat (2007), Dierwechter (2002, 2006), Harrison et al. (2007), Oldfield and Stokke (2006), Roy (2005) and Watson (2002), who address the emergence of informalities and their association with planning and urban subjectivities. However, the issue is still highly marginal to the main stages of theoretical
planning discourse. To illustrate, in a content analysis of six leading international planning journals over a period of three years (2005–08), only three (!) out of 327 published articles, were devoted to the issue of urban informality. Given the prominence of informality in the new phase of global urbanization, this is a major lacuna.

Significantly, the informality topic opens up space for novel theoretical contributions to emerge from the global South-East, and truly engage with the local and global ramifications of an emerging urban order (see Yiftachel, 2007). This is important substantially, because gray space is finding its way to North-Western metropolises, especially in immigrant societies. It is also important academically, as the hegemony of planning knowledge derived from the global North-West has been deep and persistent (see Roy, 2008). As shown recently by Stifletel and Makhopodhyay (2007), this hegemony is not only unjust in terms of distributing scholarly resources and prestige, it also impedes theoretical development on some prominent urban topics of our age.

Towards ‘planning citizenship’?

Clearly, much remains to be explored, and the conceptual scheme outlined here raises as many questions as it provides answers. There are many ways to progress in exploring these critical issues, and one may be the development of ‘planning citizenship’ as a useful tool with which to conceptualize the impact of urban regimes on people materialities and identities. The articulation of ‘planning citizenship’ can be both analytical and normative, providing theorists with a yardstick of ‘the way things are’, and ‘the way they should be’.

There is no room here to fully articulate this concept, beyond some early remarks. Drawing on the Lefebvrian notion of ‘right to the city’, but taking it further, planning citizenship should include a range of measures linking spatial policy to full political, cultural and material membership in the metropolis. It may span issues such as land, housing, poverty, accessibility, livelihood, environmental quality, as well as identity, participation and empowerment. Planning citizenship should focus on material capabilities and communal identity as areas of high priority, as distinct from state-level citizenship with its emphasis on national identity and formal rights (for early elaboration, see Yiftachel, 2007). This emphasis is applicable to all cities, but particularly to planning interventions in situations of ‘creeping apartheid’, in which the regulation of space is a central element in building, and hence also deconstructing, this distorted urban order.

Yet, merely flagging the notion of ‘planning citizenship’ runs the risk of composing an abstract wish-list. It will only be useful if planners attempt to ‘ground’ it in the actual urban planning and development. This requires professional mobilization and willingness to politicize planning through working with marginalized groups to achieve their rightful stake in the city, as well as opposing the colonization of the city by powerful interests ‘from above’. Against the proliferation of gray spaces, and in response to the conditions of urban apartheid described above, it also requires the development of ‘insurgent
planning’ (Holston, 2007), that runs against the logic of domination and exploitation which stand behind the very making of marginalized gray space, and its discursive criminalization by urban policy and discourse.

Campaigning seriously for planning citizenship means the transgression of the colonial urban order, and the opening of ‘whitened’ spaces of the metropolis to all groups. This means creating planning conditions which would release communities such as the Bedouin Arabs in Chashem Zaneh from their colonial entrapment, typically captured in ‘Atiya’al‐Athameen’s testimony to the District planning objection tribunal:

...in our rightful ‘sumood’ [steadfast struggle to remain on their land – O.Y.] we have no choice but to break the law...because the law and its plans came to this place and tried to erase it many years after it was established...our community belongs to this place, and the place belongs to the community...even if our houses are demolished again, we shall remain on our land...we cannot ever accept the plan that destroys our only community.

‘Atiya’s testimony echoes in thousands of places around the world, where the structural dynamics have pushed massive groups of people into ‘gray space’, with its typical oscillation between recognition and destruction, membership and eviction. Applying the concept of planning citizenship to these spaces implies a constant struggle against the emerging regimes of urban apartheid. I suggest that planning theorists cannot continue to overlook the importance of this phenomenon, and place it at the centre of their inquiry. In so doing they will not only respond to a scholarly need and a moral cry, but also engage with the future of urbanism itself.

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Notes
1. The classifications and definitions in this article are not offered as definite and/or discrete categories; rather, they chart some conceptual grids over dynamic fields of meanings, with full awareness that no clear boundaries exist between the various categories, and that a multitude of ‘in-between’ combinations are always possible.
References


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